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0Foreword
This study quantifies the relative risk of several different options for the return of Mars surface
samples to Earth. Risk of mission failure (loss of sample), breach of sample canister that might
result in back-contamination of Earth with Mars organisms, should they exist, and risk of the
sample getting too warm are all estimated. This data will help Mars Rover/Sample Return
Mission Planners select the best method for Earth return.
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1.0 Executive Summary
Four options for return of a Mars surface sample to Earth were studied to estimate the risk of
mission failure and the risk of a sample container breach that might result in the release of
Martian life forms, should such exist, in the Earth's biosphere. The probabilities calculated refer
only to the time period from the last mid-course correction bum to possession of the sample on
Earth.
Two extreme views characterize this subject. In one view, there is no life on Mars, therefore
there is no significant risk and no serious effort is required to deal with back-contamination. In
the other extreme view, public safety overrides any desire to return Martian samples, and any
risk of damaging contamination greater than zero is unacceptable. Zero risk requires great
expense to achieve and may prevent the mission as currently envisioned from taking place. The
major conclusion of this report is that risk of sample container breach can be reduced to a very
low number within the framework of the mission as now envisioned, but significant expense and
effort, above that currently planned will be needed. There are benefits to the public that warrant
some risk. Martian life, if it exists, will be a major discovery. If it does not exist, there is no
risk.
The four options for Earth return studied included:
Direct Entry - the Sample Return Capsule (SRC) enters the Earth's atmosphere directly from the
interplanetary trajectory and descends to the surface with redundant parachutes. An airsnatch of
the capsule is then assumed to aid in thermal control of the sample. In the event of a missed
airsnatch, the capsule will land on land.
Aero and Propulsive Capture to the Freedom Space Station - The SRC is braked aerody-
namically (aerocapture) or propulsively such that it ends up in an orbit coplanar with Freedom
Space Station. The altitude of the orbit is assumed to be in the range of 200 to 270 nm (370 to
500 km) with decay times on the order of a few months to several years depending on the solar
flux. An Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) retrieves the SRC to the Freedom Space Station
where the sample canister is removed and repackaged in a rugged container designed to maintain
the required temperature (-40 ° C). The sample is then returned to Earth in the Orbiter.
Aerocapture to a Shuttle Compatible Orbit and Shuttle Return - The SRC is braked
aerodynamically into a 370 km (200 nm) orbit. The Shuttle then retrieves the SRC directly and
returns it to Earth.
Table 1.0-1 contains probabilities calculated using a fault tree analysis of the sequence of
mission events. The probabilities are calculated using estimated probabilities for each of up to
twenty events in a sequence all multiplied together. Roughly 30 different events are used in the
calculations. Most of these events occur in several options and therefore the results have a high
level of relative accuracy although all the estimates may be systematically biased high or low.
The individual event probability estimates have large uncertainties and the results must be
viewed with some skepticism. However, these numbers provide a more quantitative assessment
of the relative risk of contamination of the various return options than has been provided to date.
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To translate breach of canister probabilities to real back-contamination probabilities, the
probability that Martian life that can do damage on Earth exists and is capable of surviving the
interplanetary transfer must be factored in. The probability that Martian life exists, etc., might
be 0.01 or less, thus divide the canister breach numbers by 100 or 1,000 to get an approximate
risk of contamination.
Prior to departure from Mars, a sample transfer from the Mars ascent vehicle to the Earth Retum
Vehicle/Sample Return Capsule is assumed to occur such that the exterior of the returning
vehicle is sterile.
The mission success probability estimates are not representative of the entire mission because
the Earth return is only the end of a much longer sequence. On the other hand, the breach of
canister estimates are representative of the mission as a whole because almost all the failures
resulting in sample canister breach occur in the vicinity of Earth.
The first column below shows the probability of success, where success is defined as simply
returning the contained sample, even though it may be warm (degraded sample). The 100%
success column is the probability of returning the contained, temperature controlled sample.
The degraded sample column in the table refers to the probability that the sample will become
too warm, significantly wanner than -40 ° C. The scientific community needs to seriously
examine what the temperature requirements should be.
Table 1.0-1, Summary of Fault Tree Calculations
Option Sample Returned, 100 % Sample Sample Can. Sample
Bio. Isolated Success Degraded Breached Lost
(100 Succ. + Sample Degraded) *
Direct Entry 98.15 97.64 0.55 0.45 1.36
Prop. Capture to
Freedom Space 96.69
Station
Aerocapture to
Freedom Space 96.68
Station
90.38 6.31 0.74 2.57
89.61 7.07 1.66 1.66
Aerocapture to
Shuttle 96.71 91.72 4.99 1.62 1.66
The canister is breached in such a manner that contamination of Earth could occur if
pathogens are on board. This includes several types of breaches: just cracking the seals,
losing the unsterilized sealed canister on Earth, destruction of the canister and spreading
of the sample in a crash on Earth, and spreading of the sample in the upper atmosphere
after a capsule break-up.
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A simple explanation for the difference between probabilities for direct entry and the other three
options is the dependence of the three Earth orbit options on one or more Shuttle launches. The
Shuttle mission success rate is currently 96 % based on 25 launches. Success rates for major
booster programs such as Araine (81%), Atlas (80 %), Delta (93 %), Long March (88 %), Titan
(96 %), Proton (92 %), (Simanis and Gubby, 1988) are all in the range of 85 to 95 %. An
average over 447 missions for all these vehicles results in a success rate of 91.4 %. No other
launch vehicle has ever done better than 96 %. Even if the Shuttle success rate goes up to 99 %
(the actual number used in the calculations), the ability to get a Shuttle into the right orbit on
time is in question.
At present, low parking orbits (370 lan or 200 nm) are proposed for the return vehicles. These
orbits can decay within a few months at solar maximum for the aerocapture vehicles under
discussion. The baseline sample return in 2001 occurs when solar activity is approaching its
peak. The risks for the options using a low Earth parking orbit can be significantly improved by
raising the altitude of the parking orbit to allow long life.
Based on the results in Table 1.0-1, direct entry is the preferred return method. Other evaluation
criteria, such as the Earth launch mass for the various options, was not considered. The only
extra-terrestrial sample returns to date (6 Apollos and 3 Lunas) were direct entry. The un-
manned missions, the Russian Lunas, were parachute landings on land.
An alternative way to view the different options is in terms of relative complexity. The simpler
the option, the better the chance of success. To see the simplicity of direct entry relative to the
other options, consider the approximate number of roughly equivalent operations needed to
nominally execute the different return options from the last mid-course on.
Direct Entry Aerocapture
to Shuttle
Aerocapture
to Space Sta.
Propulsive
Capt. to Space Sta.
14 27 68 69
A sensitivity analysis of the Table 1.0-1 results was run to see their sensitivity tO changes in the
individual event probability estimates. The probability of each nominal event was raised to 1.0
to remove it from the calculation and then the failure probability was increased by a factor of 10
to make it prominent in the calculation. Figure 1.0-1 shows a scatter plot of all the runs.
Significantly, the direct entry runs cluster with the least risk for both canister breach and mission
failure. Direct entry is the preferred option even if any of the component risk element
numbers is in error by a factor of 10.
Measures can be taken to significantly reduce the risk of canister breach below the 0.45%
calculated for direct entry. These include:
a) Fully redundant subsystems in the ERV and SRC.
b) Dual main and drogue chutes (already assumed in the calc.)
c) SCA capable of maintaining seals in a no chute impact.
d) Ability to flyby Earth until ERV separation.
e) Flight test for entry vehicle.
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f) Redundant airsnatch aircraft.
Other risk reduction measures applicable to all the options include:
a) Cancellation of the sample return portion of the mission ff signs of life are seen on Mars by
the rover.
b) Monitoring the sterile transfer operation in Mars orbit with TV cameras. Any anomaly
would be cause to leave the sample in Mars orbit.
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Figure 1.O-l, Scatter Plot of Sensitivity Analysis Runs
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2.0 Introduction/Mission Description
This analysis is a top level Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis of the Earth return part
of the proposed Mars Rover/Sample Return mission. The analysis focuses exclusively on
category I (Catastrophic Failures which will cause system loss) and category H ( Critical failures
which will result in major system damage which will result in mission loss). (MIL-STD-1629A)
The Mars Rover/Sample Return mission will retum samples of the Martian surface to Earth.
Current studies anticipate phase A studies in 1989 with the first launch in 1998/99 and return in
2001. Various methods of flying the overall mission are still under study.
Figure 2.0-1 (Cunningham and Kahl, 1988) shows one proposed method. Two separate Titan 4
with Centaur launches place a rover and an ascent vehicle on the surface of Mars at Mangala (6 °
S, 147 ° W). The payloads carried to Mars are aerobraked into Mars orbit. The rover has a range
of 20-40 kin. It collects samples and places them in the ascent vehicle for return to Earth. When
the ascent vehicle is loaded with samples, it launches to orbit and docks with an Orbiter in Mars
orbit. The Orbiter carries a stage to return the sample to Earth. The sample is placed within this
stage via a sterile transfer and launched toward Earth. The sample rides in a Sample Canister
(SC) inside a Sample Canister Assembly (SCA). The SCA is nominally sterile on the exterior.
When the vehicle reaches the vicinity of Earth, it is composed of two parts, the Earth Return
Vehicle (ERV) which is a carrier for the Sample Return Capsule (SRC) which enters the
atmosphere or parks in Earth orbit. On the order of 4 hours prior to Earth entry or Earth orbit
insertion (EOI), the SRC separates from the ERV. For the aerocapture and direct entry options,
the ERV will go on to enter the Earth's atmosphere.
A significant requirement of the program is to keep the sample at -40°C or below during transit
(Gooding, 1988). This is to be achieved by an insulated thermal protection cover that opens
when that end of the vehicle can be pointed at deep space.
Seven basic options exist for the SRC after separation from the ERV: direct entry to the Earth's
surface, aerocapture or propulsive capture to low Earth orbit and Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle
(OMV) recovery to the Freedom Space Station, aerocapture or propulsive capture to low Earth
orbit and recovery by the Shuttle, and aero or propulsive capture to elliptical Earth orbit and
recovery by an upper stage to low Earth orbit. In this study, propulsive capture to the Shuttle,
which is nearly identical to aerocapture to the Shuttle for the purposes of this study, is not
considered. Aero or propulsive capture to high elliptical orbits axe also not considered. The
high elliptical orbits are beyond the range of the OMV, and a larger upper stage is required to
retrieve the sample.
The following paragraphs describe the return options in more detail:
. Direct entry of the sample to the Earth's surface. The sample retum vehicle
enters the Earth's atmosphere directly from the interplanetary trajectory, then is
slowed by aerodynamic braking, and parachutes to a land surface, such as the
mid-continent U.S. An air recovery (air snatch) with an aircraft retrieving the
sample before it reaches the surface was baselined to aid in thermal and biological
6
control. A land recovery improves the outcome of various failures, such as a
missed air snatch, main chute malfunction, or highly off-nominal trajectory. The
only other unmanned extra-terrestrial sample returns, Lunas 16, 20, and 24 used
land recovery with no airsnatch.
Redundant drogue and main chutes are assumed to reduce the probability of
parachute failure to a small number. The entry vehicle is assumed to be a
Discoverer-type capsule, not requmg attitude control. Attitude control may
prove to be needed to achieve an acceptable error ellipse on the ground however.
. Aerocapture or propulsive capture to low Earth orbit, and recovery by the
Space Shuttle, perhaps using the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) to retrieve
the vehicle in orbit. In this study, the Shuttle is assumed capable of rendez-
vousing directly with the SRC and grappling it with the Orbiter's Remote
Manipulator System (RMS). Use of the OMV significantly complicates the
mission, but would allow use of a long-life parking orbit for the SRC, at altitudes
as high as 1,000 nautical miles (nm) or 1,850 kin.
The aerocapture SRC is assumed to be a small Apollo shape capsule that flies a
profde in the upper atmosphere and then exits when the appropriate amount of
energy has been dissipated. Following exit from the atmosphere a small burn
raises the perigee out of the atmosphere and circularizes at a low altitude,
currently 370 km. The vehicle must maintain attitude control to control the
temperature of the sample. The current plan calls for the vehicle to remain active
for 90 days.
. Propulsive or aerocapture to the Freedom Space Station. The sample is
circularized in LEO and then brought to the Freedom Space Station by the OMV.
The OMV does not normally reside at the Freedom Space Station and must be
brought to orbit for this purpose. Several options exist for handling the sample at
the Freedom Space Station. The simplest is taken as the baseline here. The OMV
is docked on the truss and the RMS places the SRC in a secure container. The
sample canister assembly is removed from the SRC and placed in another secure
container, capable of providing active thermal control ff required. The two
containers are remmed to Earth in the Orbiter.
Each option is progressively more complex and interrelated with other programs. Four simple
criteria are of interest in evaluating the options listed above:
1. The probability of 100% mission success.
. The risk of breach of container in the biosphere which is related to the risk of
contaminating Earth with microorganisms from Mars.
3. The risk of loss of the sample.
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. The risk of degradation of the sample. Failure to maintain the required tempera-
ture (-40°C at present) is an example of this type of failure. This would result in
a significant loss of information in the sample.
A significant fraction of the information about Mars stored in the samples may be lost if the
sample is heated to temperatures above about -15 °. The objective of keeping the sample cold is
to preserve the clay minerals, salts, and water ice (if present) in its Martian condition. These
materials preserve a record of how the Martian atmosphere and lithosphere have interacted for
lO's of rniiIions, and possibly billions of years. As such, these easily destroyed constituents may
preserve critical information about whether the Martian climate was ever conducive to life.
Figure 2.0-1, Mars Rover/Sample Return Mission Sequence
(Cunningham and Kalfl, 1988)
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3.0 Description of the Hardware Elements
The hardware elements are defined at a pre-phase A level of detail at this point in time. The
most detailed description available is included here for the sample return hardware in order to try
to understand a baseline conceptual design that can be evaluated and evolved.
The following general definitions aid the discussion:
Sample Canister (SC) - This is the can that carries the sample, sealed on the
Martian surface.
Sample Canister Assembly (SCA)- The SC is placed inside this can in Mars orbit. The
outside of this can is sterile.
Sample Return Capsule (SRC) - The SRC holds the SCA through aero or propulsive
braking and while it is in Earth orbit.
Earth Return Vehicle (ERV) - The ERV carries the SRC through the interplanetary
voyage from Mars back tO Earth. The ERV and SRC
separate before Earth capture and the ERV flies on by
Earth or enters, depending on the case.
SRC Canister - When the SRC is brought to the Shuttle or Freedom Space
Station it is placed in the SRC canister, a sealable can.
Before the lid is shut, the SCA is removed from the SRC
and placed in the SCA canister.
SCA Canister - Before the SRC is sealed in its canister, the SCA is
removed and placed in a smaller canister. This small can
is arranged to provide thermal control and a redundant
biological seal. It is also sturdy enough to survive some
types of Shuttle crashes.
Canister Pallet - Both the SRC and SCA Canisters are located on a pallet
which carries appropriate power hook-ups, thermal
control, instrumentation, data processing equipment, and
mechanical connectors for riding in the payload bay down
to the Earth's surface and for hook-up to the Freedom
Space Station truss.
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV)-The OMV is a small spacecraft which will go out and get
the SRC and bring it back to the Freedom Space Station or
Shuttle. The OMV does not currently have a home on the
Phase 1 Freedom Space Station. It must be delivered and
docked to an enhanced Station some time well before the
arrival of the SRC at Earth.
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3.1 Earth Return Vehicle
The Earth Return Vehicle (ERV) is a spacecraft bus that carries the SRC. It reduces the mass
that must be inserted into Earth orbit or aerobraked to the surface to a minimum by carrying the
power, propulsion, and other features needed for the interplanetary flight.
Figure 3.1-1 (Norton, 1988) shows a sketch of the vehicle with the SRC inside configured for
propulsive capture. Table 3.1-1 (Norton, 1988) shows a mass, power and subsystem breakdown
of the ERV. This version of the ERV is spin stabilized (6 rpm during cruise).
Figures 3.1-2 (Lawson, 1988) and 3.1-3 (Lawson, 1988) show an ERV configured to carry an
aerocapture Sample Return Capsule. Table 3.1-2 (Gamble, 1988) shows a preliminary weight
statement and subsystem breakdown for this vehicle. Table 3.1-3 (Gamble, 1988) describes the
ERV propulsion system.
3.2 Sample Return Capsule
Figure 3.2-1 (Norton, 1988) shows a Sample Retum Capsule configured for propulsive capture
into LEO. Table 3.2-1 (Norton, 1988) shows a weight and subsystem breakdown for this
vehicle. The SRC has two stages of propulsion for Earth orbit insertion. The four motors
marked "1" in the figure do the first bum. The two motors marked "2" do the second bum. The
vehicle is spun up by the ERV prior to the bum to a high rate. After the bum a "yo-yo" is
deployed to reduce the spin rate to about 5 to 6 rev./min. This is the only attitude control this
version of the SRC has.
Liquid propulsion systems for propulsive capture SRCs are also being considered in addition to
solids.
This version of the SRC has a small circumferential solar array and batteries. These operate a
small S-band beacon. Thermal control is provided by a thin insulated door over the SCA. The
hinge motor for this door is driven by a small aft-looking thermal sensor. Heat flux above a
certain limit, detected by this sensor causes the door to close until the flux drops.
Figures 3.2-2 and 3.2-3 (Norton, 1988) show block diagrams of the power and communications
and data handling subsystems of the ERV/SRC vehicle. The Mars Orbit Vehicle (MOV) or
Mars Rendezvous Orbiter (MRO) is also included but is not relevant to this study.
Figure 3.2-4 (Lawson, 1988) and 3.2-5 (Gamble, 1988) show a representation of the Sample
Return Capsule (SRC) designed to aerocapture into low Earth orbit (LEO). Table 3.2-2 (Law-
son, 1988) shows a weight statement and breakdown by subsystem. Table 3.2-3 (Gamble, 1988)
includes more information on the propulsion system.
3.3 Direct Entry Capsule (DEC)
Figure 3.3-I (Kerridge and Atzei, 1987) shows a DEC designed for a comet sample retrieval.
The DEC for MRSR should be similar although the vehicle may have a different aerodynamic
profde. The DEC does not circularize in Earth orbit, but rather enters directly to the surface,
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deploys parachutes, and is recovered in the air by a large aircraft before it hits the ground. The
subsystems for the DEC are predicted to be similar to those in the SRC.
Figure 3.3-2 shows a discoverer capsule shape, which may prove to be a more desirable profile
since it is aerodynamically stable in one position without active control.
3.4 Sample Canister (SC) and Sample Canister Assembly (SCA)
The Sample Canister is the original can into which the samples are placed on the Martian
surface. Prior to launch from the surface, it is closed and sealed. Figure 3.4-1 shows a concept
for this can. The SC is taken to orbit and placed inside the Sample Canister Assembly (SCA). A
sterile transfer is accomplished, such that when the SCA shuts its lid, the exterior of the SCA is
sterile. The SCA is contained within the SRC and is thermally controlled by opening and
shutting a lid that covers it and perhaps by rolling it out on tracks facing deep space.
3.5 Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV)
Figure 3.5-1 shows the OMV and its propulsion module that may have to be changed out
between SRC retrievals if two vehicles are to be retrieved. A rendezvous sequence performed by
the OMV may require as many as 10 bums ff a Shuttle type maneuver sequence is used. The
OMV will be commanded from the ground once it is beyond a certain distance from the Freedom
Space Station. When the OMV is within the Freedom Space Station control zone, it will be
controlled by the crew in the Station.
3.6 Canister Pallet
Figure 3.6-1 (Simonds, 1988) shows a concept for the canister pallet which may hold the
canisters into which the SRC and SCA will be placed. The canister pallet will be brought up in
the Shuttle payload bay, placed on the Freedom Space Station truss, loaded and sealed with the
SRC and SCA and then taken to Earth in the Shuttle payload bay. In a pure Shuttle recovery, the
canister pallet would remain in the payload bay throughout the flight.
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Figure 3.1-1, Earth Return Vehicle (ERV) with Propulsive Injected SRC
(Norton, 1988)
EARTHRETURNVEIICLE (ERV)LAYOUT
(withLEO-injectedSRC)
I - SRC
2 - SRCENCLOSURE
3 - SRC ADAPTER
4 - SRC SEPAR.DEVCS.
5 - N2H4 TANK(2)
6 - THRUSTERASSY.(2)
7 - STAR17AMOTOR(4)t
8 - BUS
9 - HIGH-GAINANTENNA
I0 - PLUMESHIELDt
II- LOW-GAINANTENNA
12 - SOLARARRAY(ANNULAR)
I - jettisonedaftermotorburnout
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Table 3.1-1, Earth Return Vehicle System Breakdown, Propulsive Capture SRC
(Norton, 1988)
Subsystem/Element Mass Pwr
(kg) (W)
Telecommunications: (18.4) (24.2)
X-bd. transponder & CDU (2)* 5.0 14.0
X-bd. SSPA (1.2 W RF) (2) 2.0 6.0
TMU (2) 1.1 3.0
Receiver RF Switch 0.5
Transmitter RF switch 0.5
Interface/Control (2) 2.8 1.2
Cables, hybrids 1.0
Wave guides 1.6
Diplexers (2) 0.8
Low gain antenna 0.4
High gain antenna (1.5m), feed 1.5
ERV/MRO RF switches (4) 1.2
Remarks
(MO) JPL Teclm.
1/4 CRAF (80% CRAF inherit.)
CRAF (100%)
CRAF (50%; less power)
CRAF (50%; less power)
GLL, CRAF
60% CRAF
50% CRAF
CRAF
CRAF
new
new
Power & Pyro: (17.1)
Solar array (annularbody-mtd.) 2.2
Batteries 2.3
(5.0)
GaAs, 0.9 m 2, 57 W @ 1.6 AU
LiTiS2, 150 W.h
Bi-dix. conv., Cfl., Distrib.
Shunt regulator
Shunt radiator
Pyre switching unit (2)
5.6
1.6
1.8
3.6
4.0
1.0
1/3 of CRAF
1/2 of CRAF
1/2 of CRAF
GLL, CRAF
Command and Data:
Main unit, TLM & CMD (2)
Data storage
(11.0)
10.0
1.0
(8.8)
8.0
0.8
(SME-50%), updated, Gulton
(new) 1 Mbyte, solid-state
Attitude Control: (10.8)
Acquis. sun sensor (3) 0.3
Cruise sun sensor, +/-64 ° FOV (2) 1.0
Star sensor 2.9
Attitude data processor 5.7
Nutation damper (passive) 0.9
(8.6)
0.1
0.6
1.0
6.9
(spin-stabilized)
Pioneer V.(M.-P.)(80%)
ADCOL (off-the-shelf)
Pioneer V.(M.-P.)(80%), Bali
Pioneer V.(M.-P.)(60%)
Pioneer V.(M.-P.)(80%)
Cabling: (17.0)
Sys./subsys. cabling 16.0
SRC umbil, cable 1.0
Temp. Control: (6.0)
Insulation 2.8
Louvers 2.4
Heaters 0.8 (20.0)**
* Some numbers in parch, indicate system redundancy
** Short term, bat. powered 14
Table 3.1-1, Earth Return Vehicle System Breakdown, Propulsive Capture SRC, Continued
(Norton, 1988)
Subsystem/Element
Mechan. Devices:
SRC release/separ, devices (3)
SRM rel./separ, devices (4)
SRC urnbil, cable cutter
Plume shield rel./separ, dev. (3)
Mass
(kg)
(4.7)
2.1
1.6
0.1
0.9
Structures: (46.4)
Bus. w. equip, supts. 21.2
SRC enclosure 6.6
SRC adapter 10.4
Thruster outriggers (2) 3.2
Antenna supports (tripod) 0.6
Plume shield 4.4
Subtotal: 131.4 46.6
Contingency: 17.7 7.0
Total (dry): 149.1
RCS (spinner-type): (67.8)
Inerts and supports 15.8
Propellant 52.0
Subtotal (ERV + RCS): 216.9
TEI PROP.: (851.7)
Inerts and supports 106.3
Propellant 745.4
Total (ERV wet +TEI PROP.): 1,068.6
Cumulative Total (ERV+SRC): 1,463.7
Pwr Rem_
(W)
53.6
15
GLL
w.GR/Ep reinforced load path
0.9 mm ilL-wound Kevlar/Ep
Gr/Ep
thin Ti, TiOz coated
(18% of 72.5 INTG.,+ 8% of
58.9 ELEC.; 15% Power)
for 200 m/s (TCM and ACS)
for delta-V = 2023 m/s
4 STAR 17A, stretched 11.7 in solid
(for SRC inj. into 370 km
circular Earth orbit)
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Figure 3.1-3, Earth Return Vehicle (ERV) with Aerocapture SRC
(Lawson, 1988)
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Table 3.1-2,
Component
Earth Return Vehicle Weight Statement, Aerocapture SRC
(Lawson, 1988)
Total
Dimensions
S_c_e 2.74m dia x 1.65m height
with 1.9m dia x lm height
cutout for SRC
Propulsion System
Engines
- R-40B engine (1)
- R-IE engine (16)
Propellant System
- Fuel
Fuel tank (2)
- Oxidizer
- Oxidizer tank (2)
- Pressurant
- Pressurant tanks (2)
0.28m dia sphere
0.28m dia sphere
0.16m dia sphere
Misc Propulsion
Total Propulsion System
Thermal Control
Avionics (No computer)
High Gain Antennae
Solar Panels and Rechargeable
secondary batteries (150% of required power)
ERV total (w/o SRC & Sample)
18
Total
Mass
8.12 kg
7.26 kg
25.4 kg
147.9 kg
3.6 kg
244.0 kg
3.6 kg
21.8 kg
20.2 kg
4.1 k_g
477.86 kg
1.36 kg
90.7 kg
? kg
651.12
Table 3.1-3, Earth Return Vehicle Propulsion System, Aerocapmre SRC
(Gamble, 1988)
Assume Payload Mass of 360 kg (SRC + SCA)
Delta V Requirement = 2027 rrdsec TEI (Primary)
= 200 rrdsec TCM (RCS)
Option II - 1 Primary + 16 RCS
Item
Primary engine (#)
Thrust, lbf (ea)
Isp, SeC
Mass, Ibm
RCS engine (#)
Thrust, lbf (ea)
Isp, sec
Mass, lbm
Fuel system
Fuel mass, Ibm
Number of tanks
Tank config.
Tank radius, ft
Tank mass, lbm
Oxidizer system
Ox mass, Ibm
Number of tanks
Tank config.
Tank radius, ft
Tank mass, Ibm
Pressurization system
Press mass, Ibm
Number of tanks
Tank config.
Tank radius, ft
Tank mass, Ibm
R-40B (1)
900
309
16.0
R-1E (16)
25
280
3.5 ea
MMH
326
2
Spherical
0.92
3.95
NTO
538
2
Spherical
0.92
3.95
N2
4]3
2
Spherical
0.54
22.25
19
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Figure 3.2-1, Propulsive Capture Sample Return Capsule
(Norton, 1988)
SAMPLERETURNCAPSULE!SRC)LAYUUT
(RETROPROPULSIVE- FOR INJECTIONINTO370km CIRC.ORBIT)
{5] (8
//
//
//
ss
/!
1 - OMNIANTENNA
2 - ELECTR.EOUIP.(TYP.)
3- SCARETENTIONLATCH
4 - BRUSHBLOCKSUPT.RING
5 - RADIATORSUPPORTRING
6 - SOLARARRAY
7 - COVERHINGEDRIVE
8 - STAR13AMOTORS(6)
9 - DESPINYOYOASSY.(2)
10 - STRUCT.REINF.RING
It - SCARADIATOR
12 - RADIATORCOVER
13- SOLARINCID.SENSOR
14 - MLI (TYP.)
t.5 - BUS
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Table 3.2-1,
(Norton, 1988)
VEHICLE Mass Pwr
Subsystem/Element (kg)
SAMPLE CANISTER ASSY. (SCA)
Sample 5.0
Sample vials (19) 1.4
Teflon retainer block 0.8
Inner container w. therm, insul. 1.8
T & P sensors 0.3 1.5
Slip ring assy.0.4
Canister shell w. gasket 2.6 -
Canister thermal insulation 0.6 -
cover, seal mech., and lid assy. 1.6 -
Lid hinge, drive, motor assy. 0.8 *
Seal drive motor 0.4 *
Lid latch mechanism 0.4 *
Retention shafts (2) 0.6 -
Wiring, drives connector 0.4 -
Subtotal without sample: 12.1 1.5
Contingency: 2.2 0.2
Total without sample: 14.3 1.7
Sample: 5.0
Total with sample: 19.3 1.7
Sample Return Capsule (Propulsive) Weight Statement
Remarks
(w)
(SRC power)
*(powered from RVR or MAV)
*(powered from RVR or MAV)
*(powered from RVR or MAV)
Kevlar/epoxy
(18% on mass)
SAMPLE RETURN CAPSULE (SRC)
Electronics: (8.9)
Telecom. + Telem. Unit 1.6 3.4
PWR: Solar array 0.4 -
Batteries 1.5 -
Condg./Ctl./Distrib. 1.0 -
Event timer 0.2 *
Pyro unit (2), jettis, squibs 3.7 *
Solar incidence sensor 0.2 0.1
Hinge drive control unit 0.3 0. I*
8 b/s dwnlk.ordy, omni ant.
Body mtd., GaAs, 0.15m 2, 8 W
-LiTiS2, 100 W.h
Solid-state: * - miUiwatts
GLL/CRAF; * - 1 W to charge
• - standby power
Structures, Cabling, Mechanisms:
Bus
Stmct. reinforcmt, for SRM's
SCA retention latch, support
SCA brush block support ring
Radiator support ring
SCA radiator (annular)
Hinged radiator cover
Rad. cover hinge drive
Despin yo-yo assy. (2)
Intemal MLI blankets
(31.9)
9.4
3.6
0.6
3.0
2.3
3.7
0.4
0.4
1.0
1.3
(4.0)
1 nan ALAIy, 4 2-mm stingers
I cm thk. x I0 cm Gr/Ep ring
Kevlar/epoxy support
Kevlar/epoxy
Kevlar/epoxy
I mm thick Cu, full hard
I nun AIAIy, covered with MLI
(intermittent power)
incl. deploy., sepal mech.
1.9 m:
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Figure 3.2-2, Power Subsystem, MRO/ERV/SRC
(Norton, 1988)
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Figaro 3.2-3, Communications and Data Subsystems, MRO/ERV/SRC
(Norton, 1988)
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Figure 3.2-4, Sample Return Capsule configured for Aerocapture
(Gamble, 1988)
PRELIMINARY CONFIGUI_ATION
0.90 m
SCA
0.7 m dia. X
(}.7m length
4
1.80 m
25
33
Table 3.2-2, Sample Return Capsule (Aerocapture) Weight Statement
(Lawson, 1988)
Component
Total
Dimensions (meters)
Sample Canister Assembly .07m dia, 0.7m height
cylinder
Propulsion System (will handle one failure per RCS pod)
Oxidizer sphere
tank (2) 0.195 dia
Fuel sphere
tank (2) 0.195 dia
Pressurant sphere
- tank (2) 0.1158 dia
R-1E engine (8)
R-6E engine (8)
nozzle .274m length, .lm dia, scarf 33 °
engine block. 13m length,. 14m width
& height
nozzle .271m length, .055m dia, scarf 34 °
engine block .13m length, .065m width,
.075m height
Misc Propulsion
Total Propulsion
Structure 1.Sm scaled Apollo capsule with
- Capsule 1.0m total height, 0.1m thickness
- TPS
Avionics (dual string)
Computation & Data Handling (1)
- Computer (2 fault tolerant) .29
IMU (3) .153 , .153w, .153h
, .22w, .19h
Total
Mass (kg)
19 kg unloaded,
24 kg loaded
10.9 kg
0.18 kg
6.35 kg
0.18 kg
0.91 kg
0.91 kg
25.4 kg
10.9 kg
1.36 kg
57 kg
70 kg
4..TAgg
144 kg
20 kg
6 kg
I
I
!
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Table 3.2-2, Sample Retum Capsule (Aerocapture) Weight Statement, Continued
(Lawson, 1988)
Component
Total
Dimensions (meters)
Total
Mass (kg)
Power (3 Battery Packs) 150% of req. .254 ,.254w,.20h 16 kg
Power Distribution & Control/RCS Control Electronics (dual string), from AFE
- Control Electronics .20 , .38w, .23h
- Power Amplifier .254 , .06w, .13h
- RF Switch (2) .076 , .05w, .038h
- Diplexer .15 , .05w, .044h
- RF Filter .13 , .03w, .025h
Total (Power Dist)
35kg
2 kg
1 kg
1 kg
40kg
Communications (taken from AFE) (2)
- Electronics/transceivers (2)
- Antennas (2)
- Transponder (1)
Total (Cormmmications)
.29 ,.22w,.19h
.203diahalfsphere
.33 ,.14w,.14h
10 kg
0 kg
t_gg
15 kg
Star Tracker (2) (from AFE) .168 ,.18w,.31h 10kg
Sample Return Capsule Accounted Mass (without SCA)
Sample Retum Capsule Accounted Mass with SCA
Sample Retttm Capsule Accounted Mass with SCA & Sample
308 kg
327 kg
332kg
(679 lbs)
(721 lbs)
(732 lbs)
* no thermal control mass growth included
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Table 3.2-3, SRC Propulsion System
(Gamble, 1988)
Item
Primary engine (#)
Thrust, lbf (ea)
Isp, sec
Mass, Ibm
Secondary engine (#)
Thrust, lbf (ea)
Isp, sec
Mass, Ibm
Fuel system
Fuel mass, Ibm
Number of tanks
Tank config.
Tank radius, ft
Tank mass, lbm
Pressurization system
Press mass, lbm
Number of tanks
Tank config.
Tank radius, ft
Tank mass, Ibm
R-1E (8)
25
280
7.0
R-6C (4)
5
290
3.0
MMH
14.0
2
Spherical
0.32
0.2
N2
2.0
2
Spherical
0.19
1.0
I
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Figure 3.3-1, Direct Entry Capsule
(Kerridge and Atzei, 1987)
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Figure 3.4-1, Sample Canister Assembly
(French and Blanchard, 1985)
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Figure 3.5-1,
; _ _,, _ ,,_-" "
Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV)
(User's Guide, 1987)
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Figure 3.6-1, Canister Pallet
(Simonds, 1988)
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Figure 33, Cannister pallet subsystems
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4.0 Comparable Operations in Each Sequence
This report presents two different methods of assessing the risk of various types of failures of the
earth return phase of the mission. The first method is to compare the nominal operational
sequences of each option.
Table 4.0-I shows the top level sequence for several options. A rough comparison of the com-
plexity of the options can be seen by comparing the steps in each sequence. Some steps, such as
a shuttle launch, are really far more complex in terms of sequential steps than is shown here, but
the general trend is correct. The sequence is for a single mission only. A dual mission has
additional steps in some options, such as refueling the OMV.
Several key points can be inferred from Table 4.0-1. First, the first five steps are common to all
options. Thus to a fast approximation, the probability that these events go nominally does not
affect the relative risk of the options. The second inference is that the Space Station based
options require nearly twice as many steps as those partly dependent on the Shuttle, and those
depending on the Shuttle have nearly twice as many steps as direct entry.
Thus, to bring the complex Space Station based options to a similar level of reliability as the
shuttle based or direct entry option will require significant extra redundancy and other risk
reduction techniques. Similarly, bringing the shuttle based options up to the level of reliability
of the simpler direct entry case will require significant effort. Sections 5 and 6 of this report
provide detail on the individual steps and how they link together in both nominal and off-
nominal missions.
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Table 4.0-1,
Aerocapture to Propulsive Capture
Space Station to Station
1. Midcourse correction
2. SRC goes on batteries
Top Level Sequence for Return Options
Aerocapture to
Shuttle
Propulsive Capture
to Shuttle
Direct Entry
to Surface
3. SRC and ERV separate
4. ERV thruster
rues to miss Earth
5. Nay. Update
6. Aerocapture 6. Insertion 6.
Burns, (2 Stages)
7. Perigee Raise 7. Deapin
8. Shuttle Launch
with OMV and
canister pallet (4 burns) t-
9. Shuttle Rendez.
with station (10 burns)
I0. Shuttle prox. ops. •
11. Canister pallet and
OMV placed on truss •
12. OMV Deployed •
13. OMV Rendezvous
with SRC (10 bums)
14. OMV prox. ops./
docks with SRC
P
15. OMV/SRC render.. _ 15.
with Sta.(10 bums)
16. OMV/SRC prox. ops. >
17. OMV/SRC placed on truss •
18. SRC placed in SRC canls.
19. SCA removed from SRC
20. SRC placed in SRC canis.
21. Shuttle Launch (4 bums)
22. Shuttle Rendez. with Sta. (10 burrm)_..._
23. Shuttle Prox. Ops.
24. Canister pallet placed
in payload bay
25. Shuttle deorbit
26. Shuttle lands
Total No. 68 69
of Operations (1 bum counts as one operation)
Aerocapture 6.
7. Perigee Raise 7.
8. Shuttle Launch
with canister
pallet (4 bums)
9. Shuttle rendez.
with SRC (10 burns)
10. RMS grapples SRC
I I. SRC placed in
SRC canister
12. SCA n_noved from SRC
13. SCA placed in
SCA canister
14. Shuttle deorbit
Insertion
Bums, (2 Stages)
Despin
Shuttle lands
27 28
6. Entry
7. Shroud Release
8. Drogue
Deployment
9. Main Chute
Deployment
10. Air Snatch
I 1. SRC placed in
SRC canister
12. SCA removed
from SRC
13. SCA placed in
SCA canister
14. Aircraft lands
14
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5.0 Fault Trees
The second, more comprehensive method of risk analysis used in this report involves
constructing a logic network for a sequence of events, nominal and off-nominal, for each option.
The events lump together into nodes or big events, the complex series of mechanical, electronic
and software operations that take place during each event. In general, redundant ways to
accomplish the same function are not visible in the networks. For example using multiple
computers with voting or having ground based calculation backing up flight computers does not
appear in on the network. Instead the redundancy is taken into account in the probability
estimates for each event. These estimates are discussed in section 6 of this report.
The following fault trees describe the major events and their possible results. The trees are not
totally comprehensive. Inclusion of all possible fault paths is not possible or desirable in this
study. Many highly improbable paths exist, that due to lack of resources or detailed knowledge
of the systems involved are not covered. Coverage of all possible paths also leads to such a large
tree that comprehension is difficult.
The approach used in this analysis is to define the sequence of events that occur in both nominal
and off-nominal mission profiles. The events are exclusively those which are directly related to
mission loss. The issues addressed in this analysis are focused on the relative merits of the direct
entry, aerocapture, and propulsive capture approaches and whether it is better to attempt orbital
rendezvous with the Space Shuttle or Freedom Space Station. Given the limited resources for
this study and the preliminary level of definition of most of the Earth return options, the analysis
was organized to focus on the differences between scenarios. Thus the fault trees showing the
different mission options were built from a series of common elements, wherever possible and
reasonable.
The fault trees are designed to show the sequence for recovery of a single SRC. The sequence
for recovery for a second SRC will vary considerably depending on the spacing between the two
SRC's in terms of time of arrival at Earth orbital altitude and orbital phasing with respect to each
other and the Freedom Space Station. Only the direct entry approach is insensitive to the SRC
relative timing, assuming that the two missions a separated by enough time for the air snatch and
ground forces to redeploy.
Figure 5.0-1 shows how the probabilities are accounted for. Following each event are up to three
paths, each with two probability numbers. The upper number is the probability that this partic-
ular result, rather than the other one or two listed, will occur. Adding up all the upper numbers
after a given event should give 1.0. The lower numbers are the overall probabilities that this
particular event will occur in the whole tree. They are the upper numbers for each line, multi-
plied all together, back to the start of the tree. Adding up all the lower numbers for the final
events in each sequence gives 1.0.
Figures 5.1-1, 5.2-1, 5.3-1, etc. show the fault trees for the various options. Following each fault
tree is a table, Tables 5.1-1, 5.2-1, etc. Each table shows the final probabilities of all the
different paths through a tree, grouped such that the significant paths are easy to identify.
Following these tables are another set of tables, Tables 5.1-2, 5.2-2, etc. These tables show the
Lotus 1-2-3 spreadsheet calculations used to calculate the probabilities. Each row is a path
I
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I
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through the tree. All the numbers in the row are multiplied together to give the final probability
for that path. Events which do not occur in that particular path are represented with a 1.0 in the
string of numbers multiplied together.
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Figure 5.0-1, Explanation of Fault Tree Events
Probabilities of individual
different results of event
(their sum is equal to 1)
9999999//_ Results of
I Event --I i;;;;;;; /.J Event
I (ERV Burn) _7- L_ (Flybys)
6.4 / .oooooo_---...j Results of
_" /.ooooooool I Event/ / I<o or,
Probability of result inSection i/n
book that
describes
the event
and provides
the rationale
for probabilities.
overall scheme (Result
probability multiplied by
preceeding stdng of
individual probabilities)
2 1
Path numbers
_%(use with spreadsheet
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2_= of a given path)2
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Table 5.1-1, Direct Entry Fault Tree Path Probabilities
Path #
I00% Degraded Can.Breach Can.Breach
Success Sample (SampleRe- (Sample
covrdor in Dstroyed)
theoryrcvrable)
I 0.94994
2 9.40E-07
3 9.50E-09
4 0.02644
5 0.00294
6 6.86E-09
7
8 2.94E-09
9 9,40E-09
I0 9.31E-t5
11 9.40E-17
12 2.62E-I0
13 2.91E-11
14 6.86E-11
15
16 2.94E-II
17 0.00027
18
19 0.00012
20
21 0.00230
22
23 0.00197
24
25
26
27 1.32E-05
28
29 1.13E-05
30
31
32
33 3.29E-I0
34
35 2.S2E-tO
36
39
39
40
41
42
Totals = 0.97638 0.00553 0.00210
S.66E-05
4.95E-07
1.24E-11
2,50E-05
Unsteril.
LostSample
(onEarth)
6.86E-14
6,B6E-16
2.74E-09
0.00230
1.32E-05
3.29E-10
Lost
Sample
(inSpace)
0,00297
0.00036
8,SIE-09
0.00990
0.00011 0.00232 0.01323
CheckSum: 1.00000 Total of Canister Breached=
42
Sterilized
LostSample
(onEarth)
0.00026
1.48E-OG
3.71E-II
7.50E-05
0.00034
0,0045316824
I
Figure 5.1-2, Direct Entry Fault Tree Calculations
Event-) Hid C. Brk-up Bait. ERV U.Entry No Ch. Srch Srch ERV Entry Aero- Reeve Drone Ha!as Air Airclt Con.Drk Grad
On Burn Lov A. lepact Me In.in In. Sep. Direct Captr Cnvr Oeply Deply Snitch Landn9 Acft Cr Bspn
Ref. G.I 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.8 6.7 6.7 6,B 8.9 6.10 6.ll 6.12 6.13 6.14 6.15 8.16 6.17
Nouin. 0.99 0.75 0.9999 0.9 0.95 0.3 0.5 0.9999 0.9996 0.99 0.99 0.9996 0.9999 0,9999 0.97 0.9999 0.99 0.9
hit. ! 0.0001 0.25 tE-O8 O.l 0.05 0.7 0.5 1E-05 0.0004 0.003 0.005 0.0004 IE-O8 IE-08 0.03 IE-OS O.Ol O.!
All. 2 O.OO99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 O 0.007 0.005 0 0 O O 0 0 0 !00 I Oegraded Can. Breach Can. Breach Unsteril. Lost Sterilized
Chk Sun 1.000 l.O00 I.BOO 1.000 I.OOO I.OOO l.O00 i.OOO I.OOO I.OOO I.OOO I.OOO l.O00 I.OOO l.O00 i.OOO l.O00 1.000 Success Siuple (Sanple Re- (Sauple Lost 5aeple Saeple Lost Saeple
Path I Event I
1
2
3
4
5
G
7
8
9
lO
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
20
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
I 40
41
42
Totals :
L 3
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0,99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.95 0.9999
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0.59 0.9999
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0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.59 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
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0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.75 0.9999
0.99 0.25 0.9999
0.99 I 0,9999 0.9
5 6
t
l
t
l
l
0.7
0.7
0.3
l
I
1
1
!
0.7
0.7
0.3
0.7
0.7
0.3
t
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.3 l
0.05 l l
0.05 I I
1 l I
0.99 I 0.9999 O.i 0.95 0.7 0.5
0.99 L 0.9999 0.1 0.95 0.7 0.5
0.99 1 0.9999 0.1 0.95 0.3 i
0.59 0.75 0.9999 O.l 0.05 I l
0.99 0.25 0.9999 0.1 0.05 i t
0.99 I IE-08 0.9 1 I L
0.99 I IE-08 0.1 0.95 0.7 0.5
0.99 I IE-08 0.1 0.95 0.7 0.5
0.99 l IE-O8 O.I 0.95 0.3
0.99 0.75 IE-OB O.l 0.05 I
0.99 0.25 IE-OB O.I 0.05 l
O.O00l 0.75 l l l L
0.0001 0.25 1 1 I !
O. 0099 1 1 i I l
l I 1 1 l l
! I ! i I !
8 9 lO
! 0.9996 0.99
I 0.9996 0.99
I 0.9596 0.59
1 0.99% 0.99
I O.9995 0.99
0.5999 0.9996 0.99
LE-O5 0.5996 0.99
1 0.9996 0.99
I 0.9996 0.99
i 0.9996 0.99
1 0.9995 0.99
l 0.9996 0.59
1 0.9996 0.99
0.5959 0.5996 0.99
IE-05 0.9998 0.99
L 0.9996 0.59
0.9959 0.9996 0.99
IE-05 0.9996 0.99
0.9996 0.99
0.9996 0.003
0.9996 O. OO7
0.9996 0.007
0.9995 0.007
0.9996 0.007
0.9996 0.007
0.0004
0.0004
0.0004
0.0004
0.0004
O.OOO,
12
0.9996 0.9999 0.9999 0.97 0.9999 1
0.9996 0.9999 0.9999 0.97 IE-06 0.59
0.9996 0.9999 0.9999 0.97 IE-06 0.01
0.9996 0.9999 0.9599 0.03 l
0.9996 0.9999 0.9999 0.03 1
0.5996 0.9999 IE-00 l i
0.9996 0.9999 IE-OB 1 l
0.9996 0.9999 IE-08 l i
0.9996 IE-08 0,99 0.97 0.9999
0,9995 IE-08 0.59 0.97 IE-O 0.99
0.9995 16-08 0.99 0.97 16-0 0.01
0,9596 IE-08 0.99 0.03
0.9995 IE-08 0.99 0.03
0.9996 IE-08 O.OI
0.9996 tE'OB 0.01
0.9996 IE-08 O.OL
0.0004
0.0004
0.0004
13 14 15 18 17 18
i 0.94994
l
1
0.9 0.02644
O.l
t
1
1
1 9.40E-09
L
1
0.9 2.62E-10
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0.00197
1.13E-05
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6.B6E-16
2.74E-09
0.00230
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4.95E-07
3.29E-10
1.24E-11
2.50E-05
0.00297
0.00035
8.91E-09
0.00990
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5.2 Aerocapture to Freedom Space Station with Processing, Orbiter Return
The tree for Aerocapture with Freedom Space Station Processing is shown in Figure 5.2-1. It is
the most complex of the mission scenarios with 73 individual paths. Many of the major branch-
es of this scenario are associated with the consequences of slow response of the OMV. The
event referred to as OMV deployment includes the complete sequence which wilt put an OMV
on the Station. The current OMV (User's Guide, 1987) and Freedom Space Station (SSP 30256)
baseline do not maintain an OMV permanently at the Freedom Space Station. Thus OMV
deployment includes the launch of the OMV in the Shuttle. Because the SRC cannot maintain
thermal control of the sample beyond the life of the power system, currently defined as batteries
rated at 90 day lifetime, hiatus in Shuttle launches as occurred after the 51-L accident will result
in loss of thermal control of the sample. A similar series of adverse consequences result if the
OMV has an on-orbit failure and cannot retrieve the SRC. If the retrieval by the OMV is very
slow, the SRC orbit will decay and the SRC will reenter the atmosphere without control,
resulting in complete mission loss.
The sequence for recovery of a second aerocaptured SRC to the Freedom Space Station may
require refueling or replacing a propulsion module in the OMV on-orbit.
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Figure 5.2-1, Aerocapture to Freedom Space Station Fault Tree
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Table 5.2-1, Aerocapture to Freedom Space Station Fault Tree Path Probabilities
Path #
100% Degraded Can.Breach Can.Brea_h Unsterilized Lost
Success Sample (SampleRecov (Sam.destroLostSample Sample
or intheory (onEarth) (inSpace)
recoverable)
I 0.89611
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
I0
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
2B
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
0,00089
0.00043
0.00360
3.57E-06
1.71E-06
0.00918
9.10E-06
4.37E-06
0.00306
0.04835
0,00005
2,30E-05
O.O001G
0.00326
3.26E-05
t.6SE-07
B,97E-06
3,61E-08
9,19E-08
0.00262
4.B46-07
0,00014
0,00279
2.79E-05
t.4tE-07
4.49E-05
1.80E-07
4.60E-07
0.00012
2.42E-06
6,12E-06
0.00012
1.226-06
0.00306
0.00016
0.00326
3.26E-05
1.65E-07
Sterilized
Lost Sample
(on Earth)
0,00043
1.71E-06
4.37E-06
0.00035
2.30E-05
I.B4E-05
0,00037
3.67E-05
1.86E-OB
46
Space
Station
Contamin.
0.00090
9.21E-06
4.B5E-05
Permanent
Orbit
0.00495
Table 5.2-1, Aerocapture to Freedom Space Station Fault Tree Path Probabilities, Continued
Path I
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
100 Z Degraded Can. Breach Can. Breach Unsterilized Lost Sterilized
Success Salple (Saiple Recov (Sa,. destro Lost Sa,ple Salple Lost 8alple
or in theory (on Earth) (in Space) (on Earth)
recoverable)
Totals =
0.00165
1.32E-05
3.29E-10
0.00141
1.13E-05
2.82E-10
6.19E-09
6.19E-05
4.95E-07
1.24E-IL
2.50E-05
O,O0165
1.32E-05
3.29E-I0
0.8%11 0.07071 0.00701 0.00038 0.00817
CheckSum = 1.0000
Space
Station
Contamin.
0.00019
0.00036
B.91E-09
1.48E-06
0.00990
0.01026
3.71E-11
7.50E-05
0.00145 0.00096
Totals of Canister Breached =
47
Peraanent
Orbit
0,00495
0.0156
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Table 5.2-2, Aerocapture to Freedom Space Station Fault Tree Calculations
Event-) hid C. Brk-up Balk. ERV U.Entry No Ch. Srch Srch ERV Entry Aero- Reeve Orgue Hains Air hircft Con.Drk 6rnd Orb. Orb. Orh.Ent Pallet Sp Sta SHY OHV 5CA CanPerige lstEOI 2ndEOI Bespin
On Burn Lou k. ]*pact No an.in Zn. Sep. Oirect Captr Covr Oeply Oeply Snatch Landn0 kcft Cr Rspn Entry Lands Brkup Drkup Proc. Oeplyd Rcvry lupact Raise Burn Burn
Ref. 6.1 6.2 5.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.9 5.10 6.11 6.12 5.13 G.14 5.15 6.15 5.17 6.18 6.19 6.20 6.21 5.22 6.23 5,24 5.25 6.25 6.27 5.28 6,29
Noein. 0.99 0.75 0.9999 0.9 0.95 0.3 0.5 0.9999 0.9996 0.99 0.99 0.9996 0.9999 0.9999 0.97 0.9999 0.99 0.9 0.999 0.999 0.95 0.99 0.995 0.94 0.98 O.i 0.9999 0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
All. I O.O00l 0.25 IE-08 0.1 0.05 0.7 0.5 IE-05 0.0004 0.003 0.005 0.0004 IE-08 IE-O9 0.03 IE-06 0.01 0.1 0.001 0.001 0.05 0.01 0.004 0.05 0.01 0.9 0.0001 0.0007 0.0006 0.0003
kit. 2 0.0099 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00.OOl 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0
Chk 5u, 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 t.O00 1.000 t.O00 1.000 1.000 1.000 i.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 l.O00 1.000 i.000 l.O00 !.000 1.000 i.000 !.000 1.000 I.O00 1.000 1.000 1.000 l.O00 I.O00 1.000
Path 0 Event i -) l
1 0.99
2 0.99
3 0.99
4 0.99
5 0.99
5 0.99
7 0.99
9 0.99
9 0.99
l0 0.99
11 0.99
12
13
14
15
15
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
e 25
25
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
2
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9559
0.9599
0.9999
0.9999
0.5399
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.5999
0.59 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.9§ 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.75 0.9999
0.99 0.25 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.59 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9955
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.75 0._J99
0.99 0.25 0.5999
0.99 I 0.9999
0.99 1 0.9999
0.99 l 0.9999
0.99 0.75 0.9999
0.99 0.25 0.9939
0.99 I 0.9999
0.99 ! 0.9399
5
!
t
I
0.5
0.5
l
l
I
1
0.5
0.5
I
l
I
l
I
0.5
0.5
!
l
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.55 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.3
0.05
0.05
I
l
t
I 0.5
t 0.5
t I
I t
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.55 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.3 1
0.05 ! I
0.05 1 1
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.3 1
0.05 1 1
0.05 I l
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.7 0.5
8
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.5995
0.5995
0.9995
0.9996
0.9995
0.9996
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9996
0.9995
0.9995
0.9996
0.9995
0.9995
0.9996
0.9995
0.9996
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9996
0.9996
0.9995
0.9995
0.9996
0,9996
0.9996
0.9995
0.9996
0.9996
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
I0 il
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.59
0.99
0.95
0.99
0.59
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.95
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
12 13 14 15 t5 17 27 28 2918 15 20 21 22 23 24
0.999 0.999 1 1 0.995 0.94 0.98
0.999 0.001 I 0.99 0.995 0.94 0.98
0.999 O.OOl 1 0.01 0.995 0.94 0.98
0.001 l 0.95 ! 0.995 0.94 0.98
0.001 1 0.95 I 0.995 0.94 0.98
0.001 1 0.05 I 0.995 0.94 0.98
0.999 0.999 i l 0.004 0.54 0.90
0.999 0.001 I 0.99 0.004 0.94 0.98
0.999 0.001 I 0.01 0.004 0.94 0.98
0.001 1 0.95 I 0.004 0.94 0.98
0.001 1 0.95 I 0.004 0.94 0.98
0.001 ! 0.05 ! 0.004 0.94 0.98
l 1 i l O.OOl 0.94 0.98
0.999 0.999 l l 0.999 0.94 O.Ol
0.999 0.001 i 0.99 0.999 0.94 0.01
0.999 0.00 1 0.01 0.999 0.94 O.OI
O.OOl 0.95 0.999 0.94 0.01
O.OOl 0.95 0.999 0.94 0.01
0.001 0.05 0.999 0.94 0,01
0,001 0.94 0,01
1 0,94 0.01
1 0.94 0.01
1 0.94 0.01
1 0.94 0.01
l 0,94 0.01
0.999 0.999 0.999 0.05 0.99
0.999 0.001 0.99 0.999 0.05 0.99
0.999 O.OOI 0.01 0.999 0.05 0.99
0.001 0.95 0.999 0.05 0.99
O.OOl 0.95 0.999 0.05 0.99
0.00 0.05 0.999 0.05 0.99
O.OOl 0.05 0.99
0.05 O.Ol
0.05 0.01
0.05 0.01
0.05 O.Ol
0.05 O.Ol
0,01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
t
i
25 26
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0,9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9993
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
l
1
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
O.O00l
0.0001
O0
"n;o
O2
48
Table5.2-2, Aerocapture to Freedom Space Station Fault Tree Calculations, Continued
Event-) Hid C. Brk-up Bait. ERV U.Entry No Ch. Srch Srch ERV Entry kero- Reeve Drgue Hains Air kircft Con.Brk 6rnd Orb. Orb. Orb,Ent Pallet Sp Sta OHV OflP SCACanPerige [stEO] 2udEO]Oespnn
On Burn Lou k. lepact No Zn.iu Zn. Sep. Oirect Captr Covr Reply Oeply Snatch Landn0 kcft Cr Rspn Entry Lands Brkup Rrkup Proc. Oeplyd Rcvry lupact Raise Burn Burn
Ref. 6.1 6.2 5.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.9 6.lO 6.ll 6.12 6.13 6.14 6.15 6.16 6.17 6.16 6.19 6.20 6.21 5.22 6.23 5.24 6.25 6.26 6.27 6.28 6,29
Nonin. 0.99 0.75 0.9999 0.9 0.95 0.3 0.5 0.9999 0.9996 0.99 0.99 0.9996 0.9999 0.9999 0.97 0.9999 0.99 0.9 0.999 0.999 0.95 0.99 0.995 0.94 0.98 0.1 0.9999 0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
Alt. I 0.0001 0,25 IE-OS 0.1 0.05 0.7 0.5 IE-05 0.0004 0.003 0.005 0.0004 IE-OS JE-O9 0.03 IE-06 0.01 0.10.OOJ O,OOJ 0.05 0,01 0,004 0,05 0.01 0.90, O00l 0.0007 0.0006 0.0003
Air. 2 0.0099 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00.OOI 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0
Chk Sun 1.000 1.000 l_O00 1.000 !.000 1.000 1.000 I.O00 t.O00 1.000 l.O00 l.O00 1.000 !.000 1.000 l.O00 1.000 1.000 1.000 l.O00 1.000 !.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Path | Event I -) i I 2
45 0.99 I 0.9999
45 0.99 0.75 0.9999
47 0.99 0,25 0.9999
48 0.99 I 0.9999
49 0.99 I 0.9999
50 0.99 I 0.9999
51 0.99 ! 0.9999
52 0.99 0.75 0.9999
53 0.99 0.25 0.9999
54 0.99 I 0.9999
55 0.99 l 0.9999
55 0.99 ! 0.9999
57 0.99 0.75 0.9999
58 0.99 0.25 0.9999
59 0.99 I 0.9999
60 0.99 1 0.5999
61 0.99 I 0.9999
52 0.99 1 0.9999
63 0.99 0.75 0.9999
54 0.99 0,25 0.9999
65 0.99 I IE-OB
6fi 0.99 I IE-00
67 0.99 i IE-00
£0 0.99 I rE-00
69 0.99 0.75 1E-OR
70 0.99 0,25 IE-08
71 0.0001 0.75 l
7l 0.0001 0,25 I
73 0.0099 1 1
0.05
0.9 1
O.l 0.95
0.1 0.95
0.1 0.55
0.! 0.05
O.t 0.05
0.9 1
0.1 0.55
0.1 0.95
0.1 0.95
O. 1 0.05
O.1 0.05
1 1
1 t
1 !
4 5 6
0.95 0.3 t
0.05 I I
0.05 [ I
t I t
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.3 l
0.05 ! 1
0.05 1 1
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.3 1
0.05 l 1
1 1
l !
0.7 0.5
0.7 0.5
0.3 !
l 1
I I
l I
0.7 0.5
0.7 0.5
0.3
t
l
I
I
l
8
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9595
0,9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9996
0.9995
0.9995
0.0004
0.0004
0.0004
0.0004
0.0004
0.0004
1
1
1
l
1
!
1
1
l
10
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
11 12 13 14 15 15 17 19 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 27 28 2925
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.9999
0.0001
O,O00l
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
Totals =
49
i m _ iron i is n im an n m m m m m m
m m m m m m m m m n m m m n m n m
Table 5.2-2, Aerocapture to Freedom Space Station Fault Tree Calculations, Continued
Shutle Sh.Rnd
Ascnt &RMSC
6.30 L3I
0.9 0.999 1 1 I 1 I I I 1
0.05 O.O01 O 0 O 0 0 O 0 O
0.05 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 100 Z DegradedCan. Drench Can. Breach Unsterilized Lost Sterilized Space Permanent
l.O00 1.000 I.O00 I,OOO i.O00 1.000 1.000 [.OOO l.O00 1.000 Success Sample (SampleRe- (Sample Lost Saeple Sample Lost Sample Station Orbit
covrd or ]n Destroyed) (on Earth) (in Space) (on Earth) Contanin.
Path ! '30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 theory rcvrahle)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
I0
li
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
3O
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
0,89611
0.00360
3.57E-06
1.71E-OE
0.00910
9,IOE-OE
4.37E-DE
O.O030E
0.04835
0.00005
2.30E-05
0.00016
0,0032E
3,2EE-05
8.97E-05
0,00043
4.49E-05
3.61E-08
1.8OE-O7
1.71E-OE
9.19E-08
4.EOE-07
4.37E-OE
0.00262
0.00012
O.O03OE
0.00035
4,84E-07
2.42E-OE
2.30E-05
0.00014
0.00279
E.I2E-OE
0.00012
O.O001E
0.00326
3.26E-05
1.8;E-05
0.00037
0.00090
9.21E-DE
4.85E-05
m
3
m
50
25-Ju]-98
Path 1
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
50
61
52
53
54
65
66
57
68
69
70
71
72
73
Table 5.2-2, Aerocapture to Freedom Space Station Fault Tree Calculations, Continued
She)In Sh.Rnd
kscnt 5RBSC
5.30 5.3t
0.9 0.999 i i l 1 1 l 1 1
0.05 O.OOI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.05 O 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 tO0 l
I.O00 t.OOO 1.000 t.O00 l.O00 I.O00 I.O00 l.O00 t.O00 t.O00 Success
_0 31 32 33 34 35 35 37 38 33
DegradedCan. BreachCan. BreachUnsterilized Lost Sterilized Space
Saiple (Saeple Re- (Staple Lost Staple Staple Lost Staple Station
covrd or in Destroyed) (on Earth) (in Space) (on Earth) Contaain.
theory rcvrable)
2.79E-05
3.57E-05
[.225-05
1.55E-07
0.00165
1.32E-05
3.295-10
!.41E-07
0.00141
I.I3E-O5
2,92E-IO
6. lgE-09
6,19E-05
4.95E-07
1.24E-Ii
2.50E-05
1.65E-07
0.00165
1.32E-05
3.29E-10
0.00036
8.91E-09
0.00990
1.85E-08
0.00019
1.4BE-06
3.7125E-11
7.50E-05
Totals : Totals 0.89611 0.07071 0.00701 0.00039 0.00817 0.01026 0.00145 0.00095
Check Sue = t.OOOO Totals of Canister Breached =
Perianent
Orbit
0,00495
0.00495
0.0155
51
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
i
I
I
I
5.3 Aerocapture to LEO, Shuttle Recovery with RMS from LEO
The fault tree for aerocapture to a Space Shuttle has 9 fewer branches than to the Freedom Space
Station due to the elimination of the OMV recovery phase, for a total of 64 branches.
The recovery of a second SRC to the Space Shuttle places the most stringent demands on SRC
orbital timing and targeting, because the Orbiter can only remain in orbit approximately 10 days.
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53 Figure 5.3-1, Aerocapture to Shuttle Fault Tree
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Table 5.3-1, Aerocapture to Shuttle Fault Tree Path Probabilities
Path i
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
100 % Degraded Can. Breach Can. Breach Unsterilized
Success Sample (SampleRe- (Sample Lost Sample
covrdor in Destroyed) (on Earth)
theoryrcvrable)
0.91716
0.00091
0.00044
0.00092
9.10E-07
4.37E-07
0.00031
0,03907
3.87E-05
1.86E-05
1.30E-05
0.00651
3.26E-05
1.65E-07
0.00165
1.32E-05
9,18E-06
9.19E-09
0.00026
3.91E-07
1.12E-05
0.00558
2.79E-05
1.41E-07
0.00141
4.59E-05
4.60E-08
1.15E-05
1.96E-06
4.90E-07
0.00024
1.22E-06
6.t9E-09
6.19E-05
0.00031
1.30E-05
0.00651
3,26E-05
1.65E-07
0.00165
1.32E-05
54
Lost
Sample
(in Space)
0.00036
Sterilized
Lost Smple
(on Earth)
0.00044
4.37E-07
3.45E-05
l.O6E-05
1.47E-06
0.00073
3.67E-06
1,86E-OB
0.00019
Space
Station
Contamin.
Permanent
Orbit
0.00495
Table 5.3-1, Aerocapture to Shuttle Fault Tree Path Probabilities, Continued
Path t
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
6[
62
83
54
100 Z Degraded Can, Breach Can. Breach Unsterilized Lost
Success Saiple (SaapleRe- (Saeple Lost 8aaple Saaple
covrd or in Destroyed) (on Earth) (in Space)
theory rcvrable)
1,13E-05
3,29E-10
Totals = 0.91716 0.04991
2.82E-10
0.00732
CheckSum=
4,95E-07
1.24E-11
2.50E-05
0.00039
1.0000
Sterilized
Lost Smple
(onEarth)
3.29E-10
1.48E-06
8.91E-09
3,71E-11
7.50E-05
0,00990
0.00852 0.01026 0.00149
Totals of Canister Breached=
55
Space
Station
Contaein.
0.00000
0,0162
Per|anent
Orbit
0.00495
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I
l
I
I
I
I
I
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Table 5.3-2, Aerocapture to Shuttle Fault Tree Calculations
Event-) Mid C. 8rk-up Batt. ERr U.Entry No Ch. Srch Srch ERV Entry Ants- Reuve 0r0ue Hains Air kzrcft Con.Drk 6rnd Orb. Orb. Orb.Ent PaHet Sp Sta 0H OlW SCACan Perige IstED] 2ndE0] Despin
On Burn Lou A. tapact No Zn.in an. Sep. Direct Captr Covr Oeply 9epiy Snatch Landngkcft Cr Rspn Entry Lands Brtup Brkup Proc. Oeplyd Rcvry lnpact Raise Burn Burn
Ref. 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 6,7 6.8 G.9 6.10 6.ll 6.12 6.13 6.14 6.15 6.16 6.17 6.1B 6,19 6.20 6.21 6.22 _.23 6.24 6,25 _.26 6.27 6.28 6.29
Noain. 0.99 0.75 0.9999 0.9 0.95 0.3 0.5 0.9999 0.9996 0.99 0.99 0.9996 0.9999 0.9999 0.97 0.9999 0.99 0.9 0.999 0.999 0.95 0.99 0.995 0.94 0.98 0.1 0.9999 0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
AJt. I 0.000! 0,25 ]E-OB 0.! 0,05 0,7 0.5 IE-05 0.0004 0.003 0.005 0,0004 |E-08 [E-OB 0,03 16-06 0,01 0,! O.OOI O.OOI 0,05 0.01 0,004 0,05 0.0! 0,9 0.0001 0,0007 0.0006 0.0003
kit. 2 0.0099 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 00.OOi 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0
Chk Sun 1.000 1.000 l.O00 l.O00 l.O00 l.O00 l.O00 l.O00 1.000 l.O00 I.O00 l.O00 l.O00 l.O00 t.O00 I.O00 1.000 |.000 l.O00 1.000 l.O00 l.O00 1.000 l.O00 l.O00 1.000 l.O00 I.O00 l.O00 l.O00
Path ! Event I -) !
1 0.99
2 0.99
3 0.99
4 0.99
5 0.99
6 0.99
7 0.99
8
9
I0
I1
12
13
14
15
16
17
10
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
3O
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
2
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.75 0.9999
0.99 0.25 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.75 0.9999
0.99 0.25 0.9999
0.99 I 0,9999
0.99 I 0.9999
0.99 1 0,9999
0.99 0.75 0.9999
0.99 0.25 0.9999
0.99 I 0,9999
0.99 1 0.9999
0.99 I 0.9999
0.99 0.75 0.9999
0,99 0.25 0.9999
0.99 ! 0.9999
0.99 1 0.9999
0.99 1 0.9999
0._ ! 0.9999
0.99 0.75 0.9999
0.99 0.25 0.9999
3 5 6
1
t
l
0.5
0.5
t
l
I
l
0.5
0.5
i
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.3 l
0.05 l
0.05 t
1
1
1
0.5
0.5
1
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.55 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.3 l
0.05 l I
0.05 l t
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.3 l
0.05 1 i
0.05 i l
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.3 I
0.05 I I
0.05 i l
1 l 1
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.7 0.5
0.95 0.3 l
0.05 1 1
0.05 1 1
7 8
0,99%
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0,99%
0.9596
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0,99%
0,9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.5996
0,9596
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0,99%
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
0.9996
tO
0.99
0.99
0.59
0.99
0.99
0.59
0.59
0.99
0,99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.59
0.99
0,99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.59
0.95
0.99
0.99
0.95
0.99
0.99
0.59
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.59
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.99
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
0.005
it 12 13 14 15 16 22 23 24 25 28 2917 18 19 20 21
0,999 0,_9 1 l
0.999 0.00! 1 0.99
0.999 0.001 I O.Ol
0.001 ! 0.95 I
0.001 ! 0.95 1
0.00! 1 0.05 t
0.999 0.999 1 I
0,999 0.001 i 0.99
0.999 0.001 1 0.01
O.OOI l 0.55
0.00[ l 0.95
O.OOi l 0.05
! !
1 I
I 1
l 1
I 1
0.999 0.999
0.999 0.001 0.99
0.999 0.001 0.01
0.001 0.55
0.001 0.95
O.OO! 0.05
26 27
0,5999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0,9999
0.9599
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
I
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.0001
0.0001
O.O00l
0.0001
0.0001
0.9999
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
m
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Table 5.3-2, Aerocapture to Shuttle Fault Tree Calculations, Continued
Shutle 5h.Rnd Urblter
Ascnt _RHSC Handeling
6.30 6.31 6.32
0.94 0.999 l 1 0.999 l I I l I
0.04 0.001 0 0 0.001 0 0 0 0 0
0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I00 % Degraded
l.O00 l.O00 1.000 l.O00 l.O00 l.O00 1.000 l.O00 l.O00 t.O00 Success Sample
Path I 30 31
l 0.94' 0.999
2 0.94 0.999
3 0.94 0.999
4 0.94 0.999
5 0.94 0.999
6 0.94 0.959
7 0.94 0.959
8 0.94 0.999
9 0.94 0.999
I0 0.94 0.999
11 0.94 0.999
12 0.94 0.999
13 0.94 0.001
14 0.94 O.OOt
15 0.94 0.001
16 0.94 O.OOl
17 0.94 O.OO!
18 0.04 0.999
t9 0.04 0.999
2O O.04 0.999
21 0.04 0.999
22 0.04 0.599
23 O.04 0.999
24 0.04 O.OOl
25 0.04 O.OOl
26 0.04 0.001
27 0.04 0.001
28 0.04 0.001
29 0.02
30 0.02
31 0.02
32 0.02
33 0.02
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
32 33 35 36 37 38 3934
0.599
0.999
0.999
0.999
0.999
0.999
0.001
0.001
0.001
O.OOI
0.001
0.001
0.91716
0.00091
0.00044
0.00092
9.10E-07
4.37E-07
0.00031
0.03907
3.B7E-05
1.85E-05
1,30E-05
0.00651
3.26E-05
1.65E-07
Can. BreachCan. Breach Unsterilized Lost Sterilized Space
(Saeple Re- (Sample Lost Sample Sample Lost Seple Station
covrd or in Destroyed) (on Earth) (in Space) (on Earth) Contaein,
theory rcvrable)
9. IBE-OE
0.00044
4.59E-05
9.19E-09
0.00026
4.60E-08
1.15E-05
0.00031
4.37E-07
3.45E-05
3.91E-07
1.12E-05
0.0055B
2.79E-05
!.%E-06
4.90E-07
0.00024
1.22E-OG
1.30E-05
O.OOE51
3.26E-05
1.8GE-05
1.47E-06
0.00073
3.67E-05
1.41E-07
6.19E-09
I.E5E-07
1.86E-08
m
Permanent
Orbit
0.00495
m m m
3
m
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Table 5.3-2,
Shutle Sh.Rnd
kscnt tRIIS C
6.30 6.31
0.94 0.999 t
0.04 O.OOl 0
0.02 0 0
1.000 !.000 !.000
Path t 30 31 32
45 I,
46
47
4B
49
50
5)
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
Totals :
Aerocapture to Shuttle Fault Tree Calculations, Continued
Orbiter
Handeling
8.32
! 0.599 I l 1 l 1
0 0.00l 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 lO0 Z Degraded
l.O00 1.000 1.000 !.000 1.000 1.000 i.000 Success Saeple
33 34 35 36 37 38 39
0.00165
1.32E-05
3.29E-10
0,91716 0.04991
Can. BreachCan. Breach Unsterilized Lost
(Saaplo Re- (Saeple Lost Sanple Saaple
covrd or in Destroyed) (on Earth) (in Space)
theory rcvrable)
0.00141
G.IgE-05
1.13E-O5
4.95E-07
0.00165
0.00036
1.32E-05
8.51E-05
3.25E-10
Sterilized Space Pernanent
Lost Unple Station Orbit
(on Earth) Contanin.
0.00019
1.48E-05
2.B2E-IO
3.71E-II
1.24E-II
7.50E-05
2.50E-05
0.00990
0.00732 0.00039 0,00852 0.01026 0,00149
Check Sue : l.O000 Totals of Canister Breached=
0.00000 0.00495
0.01_2
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5.4 Propulsive Capture to Freedom Space Station with Repackaging and Orbiter Return
The mission sequence for propulsive capture to the Freedom Space Station is significantly
simpler than aerocapture, with 43 paths (Figure 5.4-1). However, aU of the branches associated
with the OMV deployment and recovery are identical to those of aerocapture, resulting in similar
overall probabilities.
The sequence for recovery of a second propulsively captured SRC to the Freedom Space Station
may require refueling the OMV on-orbit.
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Figure 5.4-1, Propulsive Capture to Freedom Space Station Fault Tree
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Table 5.4-1, Propulsive Capture to Freedom Space Station Fault Tree Path Probabilities
Path#
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
.f.&
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
Totals=
100% Oegraded Can.Breach Can.Breach Unsterilized Lost Sterilized
Success Sample (SampleRe- (Salple LostSasple Sample LostSmple
cowd or in Destroyed) (onEarth) (inSpace) (onEarth)
theoryrcwable)
0.90380
0.00090
0.00043
0.00363
3.60E-06
1.73E-06
0.00926
9.1BE-06
4.41E-06
0.04876
4.B3E-05
2.32E-05
0.90380 0.06307
CheckSum: I
9.05E-06
3.64E-08
9,27E-08
4.88E-07
2.44E-06
O.O000I
4,53E-05
t.82E-07
4.64E-07
0.00232
0.00043
1.73E-06
4.41E-06
0.00697
2.32E-05
0,00037
0.00012
0.00741
0,00247
0.00022
7.41E-05
0.00045
0.00015
0.00069
0.00040
9.90E-09
0.00125
0.00643 0.00000
0.00500
0.00609
Totals of Canister Breached=
0.00375
0,01%2
0.0064
62
Space
Station
Contamin.
0.00091
9.2%-06
4.8%-05
0.00097
m
Table 5.4-2, Propulsive Capture to Freedom Space Shuttle Fault Tree Calculations
Event-) Had C. Brk-up Bart. ERV U.Entry No Ch. Srch Srch ERV Entry kern- Reave Drgue Hains Air Airclt Con.Ork 6rnd Orb. Orb. Orb.Ent Pallet 8p Sta OHV OHV SCACan Perige 15tEOI 2ndEOl Despin
On Burn Loek. lnpact No In.in Zn. SUp. Direct Captr Covr Oeply Oepiy Snatch Landng kcft Cr Rspn Entry Lands Brkup 9rkup Proc. 0eplyd Rcvry Inpact Raise Burn Burn
Ref. 5.1 5.2 6.3 G.4 G.5 6.G 5.7 5.7 5.0 5.9 5.10 5.11 5.12 6.13 5.14 5.15 S.18 G.17 5.18 6.19 5.20 5.21 5.22 5.23 5.24 6.25 5.25 5.27 E.20 6.29
Hoein. 0.99 0.75 0.9999 0.9 0.95 0.3 0.5 0.9999 0.9996 0.99 0.99 0.9996 0.9999 0.9999 0.97 0.9999 0.99 0.9 0.999 0.999 0.95 0.99 0.995 0.94 0.98 0.1 0.9999 0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
kit, I 0.005 0.25 IE-08 0.1 0.05 0,7 0.5 IE-05 0.0004 0.003 0.005 0.0004 IE-08 IE-08 0.03 IE-05 0.01 0.1 0.001 0.001 0.05 0.01 0.001 0.05 O.OI 0.9 0.0001 0.0007 0.0006 0.0003
kit. 2 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.007 0.005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.004 0.01 O.Ol 0 0 0 0 0
Chk Sue l.O00 I.O00 l.O00 I.O00 1.000 I.O00 I.O00 I.O00 I.O00 1.000 I.O00 I.O00 I.O00 l.O00 I.O00 l.O00 l.O00 l.O00 l.O00 l.O00 1.000 i.O00 l.O00 l.O00 I.O00 l.O00 l.O00 i.O00 1.000 l.O00
Path i Event i -) I
1 0.99
2 0.99
3 0.99
I 4 0.99
5 0.99
5 0.99
7 0.99
9 0.99
9 0.99
I0 0.99
11
12
13
14
15
15
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
2G
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
3G
37
38
39
40
41
4Z
43
Totals =
2
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.7! 0.9999
0.99 0.25 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0,9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.9999
0.99 0.75 0.9999
0.99 0.25 0.9999
0.99 0.75 0.9999
0.99 0.25 0.9999
0.99 0.75 0.9999
0.99 0.25 0.9999
0.99 0.75 0.9999
0.99 0.25 0.9999
0.99 1 0.9999
0.99 l 0.9999
0.99 l IE-O9
0.005 0.75 1
0.005 0.25 I
0.005 I !
5
1
I
1
0.5
0.5
l
1
I
!
0.5
0.5
l
l
I
1
l
0.5
0.5
1
I
l
!
t
i
I
0.5
0.5
9
0.9996
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9996
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9996
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9955
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0,9995
0.9996
0.9995
0.9995
0.9996
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.9995
0.99%
0.0004
I
1
1
!
tO II 12 13 t4 15 15 17 2518 19 20 21 22 23 24
0.999 0.999 l l 0.995 0.94 0,99
0.999 O.OOl l 0.99 0.995 0.94 0.99
0.999 0.001 I 0.01 0.995 0.94 0.98
0.001 I 0.95 l 0.995 0.94 0.98
0.001 i 0.95 I 0.995 0.94 0.99
O.OOl l 0.05 L 0.995 0.94 0.99
0.599 0.599 1 I 0.004 0.94 0.98
0.999 0.001 I 0.99 0.004 0.94 0.98
0.999 O.OO! 1 0.01 0.004 0.94 0.98
0,001 ! 0,95 I 0,004 0.94 0.99
0.001 i 0.95 1 0.004 0.94 0.99
O.OO! i 0.05 ! 0.004 0.94 0.96
i 1
0.999 0.999
0.999 O.OOI
0.999 O.OOl
0.001
0.001
O.OOl
t
I
I
0.999 0.999
0.999 0.001
0.999 0.001
O.OOl
0.001
0.001
i l 0.001 0.94 0.98
! I 0.999 0.94 O.Ol
1 0.99 0,999 0.94 0.01
1 0.01 0.999 0.94 0.01
0.95 0.999 0.94 0.01
0.95 0.999 0.94 0.Ol
0.05 0.999 0.94 0.01
O.OOl 0.94 0.01
1 0.94 0.01
I 0.94 O.Ol
0.999 0.05 0.99
0.99 0.999 0.05 0.99
0.0l 0.999 0.05 0.99
0.95 0.999 0.05 0.99
0.95 0.999 0.05 0.99
0105 0"9_9 0.05 0.99
0.001 0.05 0.99
0.05 0.01
0.05 0.01
0.01
0.01
25 27 28 29
0,9993 0,9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9937
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.9997
0.9993 0.9994 0.0003
0.9993 0.9994 0.0003
0.9993 O.O00fi
0.9993 0.0005
0.0007
1
1
!
l
l
m if n at am n n HI i i i aim
m U m rain m al m n m m mnl m an | no unto al
Path |
l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
It
12
13
14
15
16
17
Ifl
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
I 33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
Totals =
Table 5.4-2, Propulsive Capture to Freedom Space Shuttle Fault Tree Calculations, Continued
Shutle Sh.Rod
Ascot I,RRSC
6.30 6.31
0.94 0.999
0.04 O.OOl
0.02 0
1.000 1.000
30 31
1 l l l l l ! l
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 I00 I Degraded
l.O00 l.O00 l.O00 l.O00 l.O00 I.OOO l.O00 l.OOO Success Sample
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39
0.90380
0.00090
0.00043
0.003E3
3.hOE-DE
1.73E-06
0.0092G
9.10E-OG
4.4 IE-06
0.04876
4.83E-05
2.32E-05
Can. Breach Can. 0reach Unsterilized Lost
(Sample Re- (Sample Lost Sample Sample
covrd or in Destroyed) (on Earth) (in Space)
theory rcvrable)
9.05E-Off
3.E4E-Og
4.53E-05
9.27E-08
L.92E-07
4.88E-07
4.64E-07
0.00232
2.44E-06
Check Sue !.0000 0.90380 0.06307 O.O000l
0.00012
0.00247
7.41E-05
0.00015
0.00125
0.00643 O.O00OO
0.00069
0.00040
9.90E-09
0.00500
0.00609
Sterilized Space
Lost Smple Station
(on Earth) Contamin.
0.00043
1.73E-06
0.00091
4.41E-06
9.29E-OE
0,00697
2.32E-05
4,DgE-05
0.00037
0.00741
0.00022
0.00045
0.00375
0.01962 0.00097 Totals of Canister Breached = 0.0064
m
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6.0 Probability Estimates for Failures
In section 5, fault trees axe presented for four mission options. Each one of these fault trees has a
series of branch points or events. In all the trees, there are only a limited number of events. This
section discusses each of these events in some detail, and explains the rational for the numbers
chosen.
6.1 Event: Last Midcourse Correction - This is the last in what may be a series of mid-
course corrections from Mars to Earth. It is assumed that each correction targets
have been proposed in which the ERV/SRC is targeted to miss Earth and only
after separation from the ERV does the SRC make a bum that will result in the
proper entry trajectory. This idea reduces the risk of canister breach some small
amount since failures during the last midcourse, ERV/SRC separation, and initial
SRC operation cannot result in breach, only sample loss. However, this scheme
may cost weight since the SRC gets power from the ERV and it is desirable to
keep the two vehicles together for as long as possible to reduce the mass of the
SRC. The closer the last midcourse is made to Earth, the more propellant is used.
Possible
Results: Nominal Trajectory (aligned for proper Earth entry) or sufficiently normal such
that the normal mission sequence can be followed, resulting in chute opening for
direct entry, no break-up or bum-up for aerocapture and no atmospheric entry for
propulsive capture.
High Off-Nominal Trajectory resulting in a steeper than normal entry and high
g's. For the direct entry case, high g capsule breakup results. Trajectories
resulting in anything less than capsule breakup are accounted for in the Nominal
path for direct entry.
For the aerocapture case, this would be an entry steep enough to result in break-
up. An entry from which an exit from the atmosphere is not possible, but during
which the SRC remains intact is handled along the nominal path.
For propulsive capture, this case includes any off-nominal trajectory resulting in
significant atmospheric entry and bum-up in a few orbits or less.
Miss Earth - The trajectory either misses Earth entirely or is so shallow that a
skip occurs. The vehicle continues on into interplanetary space and the probabili-
ty of it returning and hitting Earth with any live organism is considered small
enough to be ignored. Some analysis predicting the probability of the vehicle
hitting the Earth at some distant point in the future is desirable to confirm this
assumption. This path is always assumed to result in a lost sample and no sample
canister breach.
Probabilities:
Nominal Trajectory - 0.99 - (Merkhofer, 1977), based on similar systems at JPL.
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6.2 Event:
Highly Off-Nominal Trajectory (entry and break or bum-up) - 0.005 for
propulsive capture.
0.0001 - for direct entry and aerocapture.
The chance of something happening other than a nominal trajectory is 1.0 - 0.99 =
0.01. Given a trajectory that is targeted for Earth or very near Earth (the "edge" of
Earth) in the first place, and the most likely failures resulting is no last midcourse
bum (rather than a wildly erratic bum) an estimate of 50% of the 0.01 is chosen
for the propulsive capture. If the propulsive capture vehicle enters the atmosphere
to any significant extent, it will bum up in a few orbits. Detailed trajectory
analysis is needed to confirm this probability guess. Merkhofer and Yen before
him estimated a probability of 0.0001 (Merkhofer, 1977) for this event. This
result is a function of the trajectory and dispersions. Merkhofer assumed the
ERV/SRC would be targeted away from Earth for most of the retum trajectory
however.
For direct entry and aerocapture, the capsule must enter the Earth's atmosphere at
an angle steep enough to result in sufficient gs or heating such that the capsule
breaks up. Initial calculations concerning an Apollo shaped capsule with a
diameter in the range of 2 meters and a mass on the order of 400 kg indicate that it
might require 200 gs or so to break up. This would require an entry angle of 20
degrees or more, depending on the entry velocity. This angle seems large and
perhaps difficult to achieve, leading to the guess that break-up will be unlikely,
maybe 1 chance in 100. Trajectory analysis is needed to confLrm this estimation.
Given that the chance of achieving this trajectory is 1 in 100 and that the chance
of being off-nominal at all of .01, .01/I00 = .0001
Miss Earth - 0.005 for propulsive capture based on 1.0 - 0.99 -.005.
0.0099 for aerocapture and direct entry based on 1.0 - 0.99 - 0.0001 = 0.0099.
Break-up in Atmosphere - Following an entry at a steep angle and high gs or
entry with no heat shield in the propulsive capture case, the vehicle breaks up in
the atmosphere. G and aero forces, and melting are assumed to cause the break-
up. Following break-up, the sample canister is assumed to be breached. The
chief question of interest becomes whether or not the sample and sample con-
taminated hardware will be sterilized. For estimation purposes, assume the
sample is dumped fi:om its container, shortly before entry. The sample consists of
small rocks, sand, silt and many size particles.
This event occurs because the aerobraking or reentry vehicle entered the Earth's
atmosphere either more rapidly than designed or due to an uncontrolled entry
where the vehicle entered with the heat shield in the incorrect orientation. The
result is the destruction of the vehicle and the exposure of the SCA to the atmo-
sphere. The SCA is a light weight structure and will be subjected to temperatures
in excess of alloy melting temperature. The sample will undoubtedly be lost. The
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6.3
issue is whether the entry heating will be adequate to sterilize the sample by
thermally decomposing any complex organic molecules, such as DNA.
Possible
Results: Sterilized - All parts of the sample are heated to a temperature at which steriliza-
tion is almost certain for small life forms carrying genetic information in long
chain molecules. This temperature is estimated to be in the range of 200°C for a
few minutes. If the SCA canister remains in large pieces for part of the entry it
will be aerodynamically heated to the degree that complete sterilization can occur.
Unsterilized - Some of the sample is not heated sufficiently to sterilize it and it
lands on the Earth's surface, resulting in contamination. The only way that the
sample can escape sterilization is ff the sample containing tubes are breached
rapidly and the fine grained Martian soil is released into the upper atmosphere.
The material will then be slowed down, but the fine particle size allows radiation
and convective cooling at a rate rapid enough that sterilization may not be
complete. The preservation of organic material in fine cosmic dust particles
indicates that such a process is possible on fine grained material.
Probabilities:
Sterilized - 0.75 - If the capsule can be designed to contain the sample until it has
been heated sufficiently to sterillze the sample, sterilization may work. This will
probably result in some weight penalty due to replacing aluminum alloy with
Inconel for example. The probability is somewhat arbitrarily picked. Analysis
can probably determine ff it is possible to build a SRC/container that will sterilize
in all situations. If it is possible then this number can be much closer to 1.0.
Unsterilized - 0.25 - Small dust particles have been shown to not experience
significant heating during entry. If the sample is released from the container,
prior to being sterilized by the heat, then contamination may be assumed to occur.
Event:
Possible
Results:
Go On Batteries - The SRC will be powered by the ERV until four hours before
Earth entry, or Earth Orbit Insertion (EOI) bum, depending on the option. At this
point the SRC will go on its intemal battery power and separate from the ERV.
The SRC internal power system is currently planned to use three separate battery
packs, providing a total of 150 % of the required power. One battery pack can be
lost and have no effect on the mission. If two are lost, only 50% of the required
power is available.
Three or Two Battery Packs Function - This results in a nominal mission with
150 or 100 % of required power.
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6.4
One or No Battery Packs Function - With no intemal power, the mission is cer-
tain to fail for the aerocapture and propulsive capture options. The direct entry
option, if designed properly and given enough mass, might be able to enter and
impact the Earth's surface, reasonably intact, but the seals on the canister are
likely to be broken, resulting in possible contamination. In addition, lack of
control will probably result in a large error ellipse on the ground. For these
reasons, in the event of no power, it would be desirable to not separate the ERV
and SRC and between the two of them, try to arrange a bum that would cause
them to miss Earth. The feasibility of this is a function of the trajectory and the
mass that can be added. This requires study, but is generally assumed to be
possible and is the nominal plan assumed for this calculation. This is assumed to
occur for all three options and to occur in the event of no power or just one battery
available.
In the event only one battery pack functions, only 50% of the power requirement
of the vehicle is available. The mission will be degraded, though it is difficult to
predict how much. At some point the vehicle will mn out of power. For the cases
resulting in Earth parking orbits, power loss may occur after establishment of the
orbit. It then becomes more difficult to locate (no transponder) and capture (no
attitude control) the vehicle. For the direct entry case, insufficient power may be
available to ignite pyros or parachute mortars or run a locator beacon. In any
event, the risk of contamination will be increased, and the nominal procedure is
assumed to be an ERV/SRC bum using ERV power to miss Earth. More study is
required to determine ff this is indeed the best course of action.
Looking at the probabilities below, the probability of one or no batteries function-
ing is so small, that whatever happens after such a failure will be very improbable,
thus the branch following this failure is not very important.
Probabilities:
One or No Battery Packs Function - 0.00000001 - (1 x 10A-8) Given a probabil-
ity of failure of one battery of .0001 (a reliability of 0.9999), the probability of
two out is calculated to be (.0001)A2 X (1-.0001)A(3-2) = 1 X 10A-8. The probabil-
ity of three out is (.0001)^3 x (1-.0001)A(3-3) = 1 x 10A-12. 1 X 10A-8 + 1 X 10 A-
12 = (approx.) 1 x 10A-8.
The reliability of a single battery is an estimate. A single battery is assumed to be
at least as reliable as a single pyro unit, estimated to have a reliability of 0.9999
(Vaughn and Graves, 1988). Better estimates can undoubtedly be located.
Three or Two Battery Packs Function - 0.99999999 - This is the residual left
over after the calculation above is performed.
Event: ERV/SRC Burn to Miss Earth - Given a failure of two or more battery packs or
failure of the ERV to separate, the ERV/SRC combination must make a bum that
allows it to miss Earth. Propulsion on both the ERV and SRC can be used. In the
event of SRC battery failure, ERV power can be used.
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Possible
Results: Nominal Burn - The ERV/SRC makes an adequate bum and misses Earth
resulting in a lost sample. The probability of the vehicle returning and impacting
Earth in the future is assumed to be so small as to be negligible, but this requires
analysis to confmn.
Burn Fails - The bum is not made or is inadequate to miss Earth. There are a
number of possibilities following such an occurrence, but the inability to make
such a bum implies a serious problem and an uncontrolled entry at a relatively
shallow angle is assumed to result. More possible results could also be mapped,
but the probability of this whole branch is so low that the effort would be wasted.
Probabilities:
Nominal Burn - 0.9 - Given one failure another may be more probable.
Burn Fails - 0.10 - The residual.
6.5 Event: Uncontrolled, Low-angle Entry - The vehicle, due to lack of power, an attached
ERV, or other failure, makes an uncontrolled entry. This event occurs when the
aerodynamic SRC, either that designed for aerobraking or for direct entry, enters
the atmosphere without any attitude control The vehicle may either orient itself
so that it is aerodynamically braked and eventually hits the Earth, or the vehicle
may break up due to high loads or orientation in a direction without the heat
shield in the proper direction. The vehicle can probably be designed to survive an
uncontrolled entry. A Discoverer type capsule could be used. The Discoverer
design (see Fig. 3.3-2) orients itself in an aerodynamically stable position without
active control. The uncontrolled capsule will have a much larger landing foot-
print, perhaps on the order of 10 x 30 um as opposed to an ellipse on the order of
2 x 5 or so (Apollo numbers). Designing a nominally controlled capsule to
survive uncontrolled entry will probably come at some cost in mass.
Probable
Results: Intact to the Surface - If the vehicle orients itself in the correct direction and
remains at least partially intact, then the SRC Canister will impact the Earth. The
impact is of an intact SRC. Subsequent branches cover whether the SRC is
breached or not and whether it is found if it is unbreached. In any case the
sample's thermal control is lost. The best that can happen is that the sample is
found intact just warm.
Breakup in atmosphere - The vehicle breaks up in the atmosphere for any
number of causes and the SRC does not reach the surface of the Earth intact. The
breakup in the atmosphere branch refers to breaking up the SRC Canister.
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Probabilities:
Intact to the Surface - 0.95 - For direct entry and aerocapture. If the weight
penalty can be paid, a capsule can probably be designed to survive intact to the
ground. This number assumes most of that penalty will be paid. For a given
design, this number is testable.
Break-up in Atmosphere - 0.05 - for direct entry and aerocapture, the residual.
Event: Surface Impact with No Chute - The main chutes fails to deploy or malfunctions
significantly resulting in a high velocity impact with the Earth's surface.
Possible
Results: Sample Canister Breached The impact results in rupture of the sample
container. In water, contamination will certainly occur following this. On land, it
may well occur.
Sample Canister Unbreached - The impact does not rupture the sample con-
tainer. The sample is contained.
Probabilities:
Sample Canister Breached - 0.30 - A breach in the sample container can be
avoided by careful packaging and addition of materials to absorb the energy of the
impact. This may cost weight however. Balsa is one candidate energy absorber,
causing an estimated weight penalty on the order of 10 kg. Another concept
involves placing the sample in a tough, flexible bag that would contain it while all
the metal around it is deformed. The energy absorption system is easily testable
and could be well developed at the cost of capsule mass. On the other hand, the
seals of the canister are likely to be fragile. Contamination is defined hereas as
little as a loss of seal integrity and exposure of some of the sample to air.
Terminal velocity of the capsule is estimated to be in the range of 210 ft/sec.
Peak decelerations are esthnated to range from 2,000 g's (water landing) to 4,000
gs (landing on rock) based on an analysis to estimate water landing loads. The
program was modified to estimate land landing loads.
The 0.30 number is a guess. Testing can determine this number precisely.
Sample Canister Unbreached - 0.70 - See above, 1.0 - 0.30 = 0.70.
Event: Search for SRC on Earth -This event is the search for an SRC which has landed
without parachutes and not been breached. The search would not be aided by any
radio beacon due to the fact that the vehicle would not be equipped with one
durable enough to survive a hard landing. A land landing is assumed because the
primary requirements are to find the sample and not contaminate the Earth. Land
landings offer the best chance for both of these. A land area can even conceivably
be sterilized in the event of a breach of the sample container.
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Two different cases must be noted. In one case, the impact follows failures on-
orbit resulting in an uncontrolled entry or other failures resulting in landing in a
randorrdy determined area. Decay of a parking orbit is a good example of this
kind of failure. The capsule will be much more difficult to fred in this case.
The other case involves failures on the nominal trajectory, after entry, such as a
parachute failure. The nominal landing zone would still be used. The vehicle
would just hit hard.
Probable
Results: SRC and Canister Found - If the intact SRC is found, the sample will have been
warmed above the required -40°C, assuming that it lands in areas other than the
Antarctica, Greenland or the Arctic regions of Eurasia or North America during
the winter. A nominal landing zone would be in a Southwestern U.S. desert, in
the Midwest U.S. wheat fields or in the Central Soviet Union.
SRC and Canister Not Found - If the sample is not found it obviously has no
value and adds to the risk of contamination.
Probabilities:
SRC and Canister Found - 0.50 - For the random landing. The SRC will be
tracked prior to entry by NASA, NORAD and its Soviet equivalent. Thus the
impact location will be estimated within an ellipse a few miles wide and at most a
few tens of miles long, within an area of a few hundred square miles. If the SRC
lands in the ocean it can easily be lost. If it lands in a flat area with either little
vegetation or row crops the probability of discovery is very high. If, on the other
hand it lands in a forest or jungle it may not be found. Since the oceans occupy
70 percent of the Earth's surface and forest and jungle cover about a third of the
land, the probability of discovery is about 20% if the landing area is randomly
chosen.
The above philosophy is based on experience with searches that may be rather
poorly funded compared to what would be expected for this search. Given the
sample is in a known area, land or water, the search will continue until the
searchers run out of money. Ignoring factors associated with time-consuming
searches such as theft of the sample by non-government searchers, and burial of
the sample with sediment, the probability of finding the sample goes up with the
money and time spent. A search like the one conducted for nuclear warheads lost
in the Mediterranean could be expected and the probability of finding it is
assumed to be significantly better than 20%.
0.99999 - for landing in the nominal landing zone. The nominal landing zone will
be on land in a cleared area. Given adequate time and money, and baring simple
theft and other strange misfortune, it is difficult to conceive of losing the sample.
SRC and Canister Not Found - 0.50 - For the random case, the residual.
0.00001 - For the targeted case. The residual.
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6.8
6.9
Event: ERV Separation - Based on internal or ground commands the ERV and the SRC
will separate approx, four hours prior to Earth entry. This event is a function of
the correct functioning of the data and communications systems, both redundant,
and a minimum of 3 pyros.
Possible
Results: Nominal Separation - The command is sent, all three pyros fire, and nominal
separation occurs. At the present time, the ERV is assumed to enter the Earth's
atmosphere for all but the propulsive capture case, and no further attention is paid
to it. The probability of contamination of the ERV is assumed to be very small.
A sterile transfer is to have taken place in Mars orbit. Any detected anomaly in
this transfer would be cause to leave the vehicle in Mars orbit.
Failure to Separate - At least one of the three pyros does not fire and the two
vehicles do not separate. Following this failure, an attempt is made to do a bum
that causes the vehicle to miss Earth.
Probabilities:
Nominal Separation - 0.9996 - Each pyro is assumed to have a reliability of
0.9999. The probability of at least one failing is (.9999)^3 = 0.9997. An addi-
tional I chance in a thousand is thrown in to account for failures of the data/com/-
power distribution/etc.
Failure to Separate - 0.0004 - The residual.
Event: Direct Entry - For the direct entry option, the vehicle enters the atmosphere at
any angle shallow enough to avoid break-up, predicted to be anything less than 20
degrees.
Possible
Results: Nominal Entry is a controlled entry leading to the nominal sequence.
High Skip is an entry at such a shallow angle that the vehicle skips out and misses
Earth. Other reasons for a high skip and miss might include a guidance or
navigation failure of some kind such that the vehicle is guided out of the atmo-
sphere.
Skip to Orbit or High Gamma Entry - These cases, though radically different,
have the same result, an uncontrolled entry.
In the skip to orbit, the vehicle skips out, but enough energy is lost to put it in an
elliptical orbit. The orbit will pass through the atmosphere at each perigee and
will therefore decay quickly to an unplanned landing.
In the high gamma entry, the entry will be far too steep due to some failure,
resulting in high gs and loss of control
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Probabilities:
Nominal Entry - 0.99 - This is an estimate, subject to dispute. Historical data
from past programs resulting in entries could be researched to come up with a
better number.
High Skip - 0.003 - The residual probability remaining after nominal entry is
0.01. The high skip is felt to be somewhat less likely than the alternative,
resulting in an uncontrolled entry and is therefore assigned 30 % of the residual.
Skip to Orbit or High Gamma Entry - .007 - The other 70 % of the residual
(0.01 - 0.003).
6.10 Event: Aerocapture Maneuver - The SRC goes into the atmosphere and dissipates
enough energy to enter an orbit with apogee near the Freedom Space Station orbit.
After exiting the atmosphere and reaching apogee, a circularization burn raises the
perigee out of the atmosphere.
Possible
Results: Nominal - The SRC enters and exits the atmosphere on a trajectory close enough
to nominal to enable circularization in a near Freedom Space Station orbit.
Exit Early - The SRC leaves the atmosphere before dissipating enough energy to
get the apogee low enough to allow retrieval by the OMV. If the vehicle's perigee
can be raised out of the atmosphere, the SRC will go into a long term, but perhaps
inaccessible orbit.
Unplanned Entry - The SRC enters the atmosphere and dissipates too much
energy, resulting in an inability to exit the atmosphere or an apogee that is too
low, resulting in entry in a few orbits or tens of orbits.
Probabilities:
Nominal - 0.99 - an estimate, subject to dispute. The aerocapture maneuver is at
least as complicated as the midcourse, which has a referenced 0.99 success
estimate.
Exit Early - 0.005 - one half of the residual.
Unplanned Entry - 0.005 - the other half of the residual.
6.11 Event: Remove Cover - Prior to release of the drogue chutes during direct entry, a cover
or shroud, covering the chutes is assumed to be released by three pyrotechnic
devices. The release of the cover reduces the hung weight and uncovers the
chutes.
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Possible
Results: Nominal - The pyrotechnic devices fire as planned and the cover is removed.
Cover Not Removed - Due to signal or pyro failures, the cover does not come
off. The chutes can therefore not deploy and the capsule hits the ground at a high
velocity.
Probabilities:
Nominal - 0.9996 - Given a reliability for a single pyro unit of 0.9999 (Vauglm
and Graves, 1988), the reliability for the system is (0.9999Yx3 = 0.9997. An
additional .0001 is subtracted to account for reliability in the system sending the
signal to the pyros.
Cover Not Removed - 0.0004 - the residual.
6.12 Event: Drogue Deployed - Two redundant, mortar-deployed drogue chutes may be used
to stabilize the capsule and slow its descent rate some, prior to opening the main
chutes. In Apollo, the drogues were deployed at 25,000 ft. and the mains at
12,000 ft. Prior to deployment of the mains the drogues were cut away.
Possible
Results: One or Both Drogues Deployed - At least one drogue is deployed _LSplanned.
The system is designed for one drogue deployment as a nominal case. The second
drogue is redundant.
No Drogues Deployed - If for some reason no drogue chutes deploy, the capsule
may be tumbling, and will certainly be going faster when the main chutes deploy.
If the mains can be designed to take the dynamic pressure without the drogues, the
probability that they will deploy is still very high. It is assumed the main chutes
can be designed to take rids dynamic pressure and that some weight penalty will
result.
Probabilities:
One or Both Drogues Deploy - 0.99999999 - The military currently has roughly
one malfunction per 10,000 live jumps with the T-10 chute. Fatalities are I per
one million jumps. The malfunction probability is therefore 0.0001. With two
redundant chutes, the probability is (0.0001) ^2 = 0.00000001. The probability of
success is the residual. It has been estimated that the reliability of the standard
military chute could be substantially increased by better packing. On the other
hand, the MRSR chute will never be tested and developed to the degree the
military chute system has been, and must survive the space environment for three
years or more. Apollo testing showed chutes could remain packed for four years
without degradation however (Kiker, 1988).
No Drogues Deploy - 0.00000001 - See above.
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6.13 Event: Main Chutes Deployed - Two mortar-deployed, redundant main canopies are
assumed to deploy somewhere around 10,000 ft. The deployment mechanism is
assumed to be an atmospheric pressure switch f'Lring the mortars and the drogue
cutaway pyro simultaneously. The pressure switch must be armed by the
sequencing logic at some point higher in the trajectory and power must be
provided to the initiators.
Failure to cut away the drogues will result in some small increase in the probabil-
ity of malfunction of the mains, but this is ignored here. The main chutes are
assumed to be designed to be deployable even in the absence of one or both
drogues. It is assumed they will be able to take the greater dynamic pressure due
to the higher airspeed.
Possible
Results: One or Both Mains Deployed - The main chutes are assumed to be redundant. If
at least one successfully deploys, a normal landing is assumed to take place.
No Mains Deploy - Failure of both main chutes to deploy will result in a high
velocity landing.
Probabilities:
One or Both Mains Deployed - 0.99999999 - See discussion for drogue chutes.
0.99 - if no drogues deploy (Kiker, 1988). Failure of at least one drogue to deploy
will significantly reduce the chance of a successful main chute deployment,
however, ff the system is properly designed, successful main chute deployment
can still be made quite probable. If at least one drogue does not deploy, the
capsule will be going much faster at main chute deployment and may also have
some tumbling motions that might lead to a malfunction in the mains.
No Mains Deploy - 0.00000001 - The residual.
0.01 - if no drogues deploy. The residual.
6.14 Event: Air Snatch - In order to reduce the chance of contamination as much as possible
and increase the chances of maintaining the required thermal conditions (-40 ° C),
the SRC, hanging from one or more chutes, will be snatched in the air by a large
aircraft and brought on board using a technique developed over a long period of
time for military film canisters. Even if the air snatch is missed, a relatively
nominal landing on land is anticipated, with a somewhat greater chance of the
sample warming up.
Possible
Results: Success - The SRC is swung into the interior of the aircraft and placed in a
biological containment canister capable of providing thermal control to the
sample.
76
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
l
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
II
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Miss - The SRC makes a land landing, with no breaching of the sample, given at
least one functional chute. Given a rapid ground response and location of the
capsule before it gets too warm, the nfission can still be a complete success.
Probabilities:
Success - 0.97 - This is approximately the success rate for military air snatch
operations (Kiker, 1988).
Miss - 0.03 - The residual.
6.15 Event: Aircraft Landing - Following successful air snatch and onboard containment and
thermal control of the sample, the aircraft flies to a designated location and
unloads the sample for ground transport to an analysis laboratory.
Possible
Results: Nominal - The aircraft returns and lands without incident.
Crash - The aircraft crashes between successful snatch and landing. The sample
may or may not be breached.
Probabilities:
Nominal - 0.999999 - There is roughly one fatal accident in one million aircraft
operations (takeoff or landing) in the U.S. air carrier fleet (Merkhofer, 1971). The
sample carrying aircraft should do at least this well.
Crash - 0.000001 - The residual.
6.16 Event: Container Breakup in Aircraft Crash - In the event of an aircraft accident, most
probably related to landing, the SRC will be in a thick-walled, thermal controlled
containment.
Possible
Results: Container Breakup - Yes - the containment is broken and the sample is exposed
to the air and thermal control is lost. Contamination is therefore considered to
have occurred.
Container Breakup - No - The containment remains intact, but it is assumed that
thermal control is lost and the sample warms up to some extent.
Probabilities:
Container Breakup - Yes - 0.01 - The sample container can be heavy and strong
(half-inch steel). A well designed container can survive a substantial crash.
Container Breakup - No - 0.99 - The residual. Even if the container does not
breakup, thermal control is assumed to be lost.
6.17 Event: Ground Response to Air Snatch Miss - In the event an air snatch is missed, the
ground personnel must quickly find and thermally control the sample.
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Possible
Results: Fast Response - The sample is quickly recoveredbefore thermal limits are
exceeded.This is far more difficult to do at sea than on land due to the high heat
capacity and thermal conductivity of water.
Slow Response - The ground cannot find the sample and plug in thermal control
before it warms up.
Probabilities:
Fast Response - 0.9 - Helicopters can back up the main recovery aircraft and
quickly locate and direct ground vehicles to the sample. The recovery aircraft can
also do the same.
Slow Response - 0.1 - The residual.
6.18 Event: Orbiter Entry =This event is the combination of all of the events that occur from
the time the orbiter begins to undock with the Freedom Space Station until it
begins final approach for landing.
Possible
Results: Nominal Entry - The next event is landing.
Orbiter Breakup during entry - The SRC Canister would be exposed to the
airstream after breakup occurred. Following breakup, if the sample container is
properly designed, it may sterilize the sample with heating prior to releasing it. If
breakup occurs after the heating phase of entry, the sample will not be sterilized,
however the container will still hold it.
Probabilities:
Nominal entry - 0.999 - The Orbiter has made 24 successful entries in 24
attempts. Other than failures of the thermal protection system, the entry phase has
a high degree of redundancy.
Crash or Orbiter Breakup during Entry - 0.001 - This sort of event could occur
due to either a guidance or control failure or possibly a critical high temperature
black tile coming off during launch. This sort of failure has been considered in
Orbiter design, and the design has been certified as part of the Orbiter reevalu-
ation following the 51-L incident.
6.19 Event: Orbiter Lands - Following a successful deorbit and entry the Orbiter lands. A
variety of failures are possible, ranging from the landing gear's failure to deploy
or a hard landing, resulting in gear collapse to a flight control failure.
Probable
Results: Nominal - The successful landing of the orbiter terminates the mission and results
in the delivery of the sample to a waiting team of curation and scientific person-
nel.
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Crash - A crash should not normally result in the canister pallet breaking loose
from the trunnion and keel fittings. The pallet is designed to remain in place even
following a crash as are all orbiter payloads.
Probabilities:
Nominal - 0.999 - The flight record is for 24 successful landings for 24 attempts
following orbital flights and 6 successes for 6 attempts during the Approach and
Landing Tests.
Crash - 0.001 - The residual probability.
6.20 Event: Orbiter Breakup on Entry - The event is the destruction of the Orbiter due to a
TPS burn through, malfunction, or operational error. The event results in the
exposing of the SRC Canister to the airstream. The canister will be heated to high
temperatures. The canister and associated debris will hit the Earth at high
subsonic velocities. The sample has certainly been degraded at this point, the
only question is whether or not it has been sterilized.
Probable
Results: Sample Sterilized - The sample container is heated either as a whole or after
breaking up to temperatures that decompose complex organic molecules (such as
DNA) that are critical for the Martian pathogens to reproduce.
Sample Not Sterilized - The sample container is broken up and parts of the clay
and free sand portions of the sample are aerodynamically slowed before they are
heated to sterilizing temperatures.
Probabilities:
Sample Sterilized - 0.95 - Hard data is not available that can be used to estimate
this probability. However, the most likely scenario is that the SRC container
would be designed to withstand high aerodynamic and heating loads. In our study
of MRSR requirements affecting Freedom Space Station (Simonds, 1988) it was
recommended that the SRC Canister be made of Inconel 718 which maintains its
strength at temperatures in excess of 900°C.
Sample Not Sterilized - 0.05 - The residual.
6.21 Event: Pallet Breakup following Orbiter crash landing - As a result of a crash landing
thermal control of the sample will certainly be lost, since the ground crew's top
priority will be the rescue of the crew.
Probable
Results: Degraded Sample - A degraded, that is a warm sample will result from the loss
of thermal control. However, the SRC and the SRC Canister should remain intact.
Canister Breach - The sample canister, inside the SCA and SCA canister, is
breached.
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iProbabilities:
Degraded Sample - 0.99 - This is the likely event since the pallet is designed to
not break loose from the orbiter during a crash and the SCA Canister is designed
to withstand impact loads. The probability is estimated at 0.99 to cover the
possibility of loads in excess of those for which the SCA canister is designed.
Canister Breach - 0.01 - The residual.
6.22 Event: SRC Docking and Freedom Space Station Processing - This event encompas-
ses a series of operations covering the docking of the OMV, placing of the SRC in
the SRC canister on the truss mounted pallet, and transfer of the SCA from the
SRC to the SCA canister. The baseline level of processing considered in this
scenario is simply repackaging of the SCA from the SRC into the SCA canister,
mounted on the pallet, attached to the Freedom Space Station Truss. This
scenario was developed by Eagle Engineering (Simonds, 1988). This event is
unique in that it is possible to contaminate the Freedom Space Station without
damaging the sample, since the probable paths for contamination are due to
malfunctions in the sample handling in Mars Orbit.
The steps in SRC docking and processing the sample on the Freedom Space
Station include:
Docking of the OMV, placing of the SRC in the SRC canister on the tress
mounted pallet.
Removing the SCA from the SRC and placing the SCA in the actively cooled
SCA canister, mounted on the same pallet mounted on the truss. The SCA
canister cooling system may keep the sample within specifications with a simple
sun shade.
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Placing the complete SRC canister and SCA canister and the attached pallet in the
Orbiter payload bay.
I
Supplying the pallet with any utilities from the Orbiter, and preparing the Orbiter
for deorbit. I
Possible
Results: No contamination of Freedom Space Station - The nominal case. i
Contamination of Freedom Space Station - This case assumes that Mars dust i
has somehow gotten outside the SCA in the SRC. This dust has then found its way II
to the Freedom Space Station itself. This can be due to contamination of the
exterior of the SRC due to an undetected sterile transfer failure in Mars orbit or •
some other failure. i
I
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Loss of Sample Thermal Control - Due to a system failure or human error, the
sample becomes too warm. Measures can probably be taken to reduce this
probability to a small number, but some expense may be involved. For the simple
repackaging scenario proposed here, the sample is assumed to use passive thermal
control measures with a sin1 shade. A detailed thermal analysis is required
however to make sure this will work.
Probabilities:
No contamination of Freedom Space Station - 0.995 - (Really 0.999 if the loss
of thermal control case, 0.004, is included) Extreme precautions are going to be
taken to confine the SRC canister, thus the probability that the station is con-
taminated is arbitrarily set at 999%. The real danger may be failure of the sterile
transfer in Mars orbit and contamination of the exterior of the SRC. Numerous
redundancies can be designed into the handling process at the Station, making the
probability of contamination very low.
Contamination of Freedom Space Station - 0.001 - Freedom Space Station
contamination probability is arbitrarily set at 0.001.
Loss of Thermal Control - 0.004 - This number is subject to dispute.
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6.23Event: OMV Launched and Deployed - This event is the single most important event
influencing the overall probability of getting a degraded sample for the aero-
capture and propulsive capture to the Freedom Space Station options. This event
encompasses the complete process of getting the OMV from Earth to leaving the
Freedom Space Station on the way to picking up the SRC. This aspect of the
mission assumes that the OMV is attached to the Freedom Space Station, not the
Orbiter. As of the date of preparation of this report, this assumption is contrary to
the NASA Freedom Space Station baseline. The OMV does not have a place to
park on the Freedom Space Station. For a variety of reasons, however, parking
the OMV at the Freedom Space Station is the preferred method for use of the
OMV with the Freedom Space Station for this case. There is effectively no way
to bring the SRC to the Freedom Space Station without the OMV. Getting the
OMV deployed on-orbit involves the following steps:
a) Preparation and Checkout of the OMV at KSC
b) Mounting the OMV in the Orbiter
c) Launching the Orbiter
d) Rendezvous of the Orbiter with the Freedom Space Station
e) Transfer of the OMV to the Freedom Space Station
f) Checkout of the OMV on the Freedom Space Station
g) Maintenance and repair of the O1VIV, including refueling the OM'V for
the recovery of the second SRC (these calculations only address one
mission however)
h) Deployment of the OMV from the Freedom Space Station
Probable
Results: Nominal - The nominal case is that the OMV is ready to retrieve the SRC within
the time that it can maintain thermal control of the sample on-orbit. This time
period may be as little as three orbits or as long as 90 days.
Slow Deployment - Slow deployment means an OMV deployment that is not in
time to retrieve the SRC within the thermal control of the sample. It is assumed
that passive thermal control of the SRC without attitude control is not possible. It
is further assumed that a spin stabilized SRC would not be stable in the correct
orientation with the Sample container pointed away from the Sun to maintain
thermal control.
Not Deployed - Not Deployed means that the OMV cannot be deployed to
retrieve the SRC within the orbital lifetime of the SRC. Thus the SRC does an
uncontrolled reentry. See section 6.24 and section 11.0 for estimates of the orbital
lifetime of the SRC.
Probabilities:
Nominal - 0.94 - The nominal case is essentially the probability of the normal
functioning of the Shuttle program for some period of time prior to and during the
OMV deployment. This number is basically the residual left over after the two
estimates that follow.
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6.24 Event:
Probable
Results:
Slow Deployment - 0.05 - Prudent mission plannh3, g would manifest the OMV on
a Shuttle flight to the Freedom Space Station in advance of the SRC arrival at
least one logistics flight earlier than needed, that is somewhere between 90 and
180 days prior to earth orbit insertion. Thus only a complete halting of Shuttle
launches as occurred after 51-L could prevent deployment. The OMV should be
readily maintained on-orbit, assuming that adequate spares are available. Thus
the probability of slow deployment is almost totally that of a 51-L type hiatus in
Shuttle launches. The probability of that event is assigned a value of 0.05. If
every flight had a 0.99 ascent success probability, then five flights would have an
ascent success probability of (0.99)^5 = 0.95. Five flights represent some time
frame on the order of a year or less in which a 51-L type accident could slow
deployment of the OMV.
Not Deployed - 0.01 - The most likely event to prevent the deployment of the
OMV is its loss during a Shuttle launch. There is only one OMV planned at this
time. This event has been assigned a probability of 0.01. This number assumes
the probability of a successful Shuttle ascent is 0.99.
OMV Recovery - The OMV recovery sequence begins when the OMV 'is
undocked from the Freedom Space Station and ends when the OMV and re-
covered SRC enter the proximity operations volume around the Freedom Space
Station. The process involves the following steps:
a) Getting an adequate state vector for the SRC.
b) Having the SRC rotation rates within the abilities of the OM'V to dock
with it.
c) Loading the OMV with the proper state vectors and bum calculating
algorithms.
d) Deploying the OMV.
0 Orienting the OMV and commencing a bum sequence. As many as 10
bums may be needed.
g) Having the OMV proximity operation sensors lock on the SRC.
h) Matching the OM'V and SRC attitude rates.
g) Docking the OMV and SRC.
h) Reorienting the combined SRC and OMV and beginning a series of
bums back to the Freedom Space Station (I0 bums).
i) Entering the Freedom Space Station proximity operations volume.
j) Docking with the Freedom Space Station.
Nominal - The nominal case involves a complex series of navigation and state
vector updates, propulsive maneuvers and proximity operations, the majority of
which are ground controlled. The OMV will be controlled from the Freedom
Space Station when it is within a certain minimum range.
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Slow Recovery - Slow recovery means an OMV recovery that does not permit the
SRC to maintain thermal control of the sample. It is assumed that passive thermal
control of the SRC, lacking attitude control, is not possible. It is further assumed
that a spin stabiliT.ed SRC would not be stable in the correct orientation with the
sample container pointed away from the Sun to maintain thermal control.
No Recovery - Means that the recovery can not be completed within the orbital
lifetime of the SRC. Thus the SRC does an uncontrolled reentry. The following
brief table (computed using Richter, 1966) gives an idea of the orbital lifetime of
a small satellite based on the 1962 standard atmosphere. The atmosphere model is
near worst case. In the conclusions and recommendations section (11.0), a 1972
atmosphere model is used with variations for the solar cycle to get a better idea of
the lifetimes involved. Changes in the solar flux, which vary with the sunspot
cycle, can increase the density by a factor of 10 and bring the vehicle in much
quicker. The ballistic number of the vehicle (W/Cd*A) is assumed to be on the
order of 18, using a weight of 800 lbs, a Cd of 1.8 and an area of 24 ft sq., based
on a 5.6 ft (1.7 m) diameter Apollo shape.
Apogee Perigee Lifetime/Ballistic Orbit
Altitude Altitude Number Lifetime
nm nm day/(lb/ft sq.) days
250 250 20 360
230 230 10 180
220 220 7 126
150 150 0.8 14
290 190 9 162
290 100 0.6 11
250 80 0.25 5
250 70 0.10 2
Probabilities:
Nominal - 0.98 - The best data base for such a series of automated/ground
controlled rendezvous and docking maneuvers are the Soviet's experience docking
with Salut and MAr. They have experienced approximately 6 serious problems
where vehicles either missed docking, or docking operations had to be aborted
because closing rates were too high. However, most of the missions were
eventually completed. A 0.98 success rate is assumed. It can be argued that to do
the MRSR mission with Mars orbit rendezvous as is currently planned, the U.S.
will have to develop a good system for near totally automated rendezvous.
Slow Recovery - 0.01 - The OMV is designed to perform satellite servicing
missions that are similar to recovering the SRC. The principle reason for a slow
recovery might be SRC tumbling which would require development of special
procedures to complete the recovery. Given the decay times shown above, there
will be little time to develop new techniques or hardware to catch the sample if
something goes wrong.
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No Recovery - 0.01 - The OMV has a high level of redundancy to complete its
mission and the recovery of the SRC should not be significantly different from
other satellite servicing missions for which the OMV is designed. Thus the
probability of 0.01 is assigned to no recovery. Multiple OMVs could also be
placed at the Freedom Space Station. Only one OMV is currently planned
however.
6.25 Event: SCA Canister Impact - The impact of the SCA canister at a high velocity, into
the Earth following breakup of the Orbiter during descent to landing. The
possibility of breakup of the Orbiter following entry has not been considered in
the calculations or the fault trees. Orbiter breakup during entry is assumed to
result in a sterilized sample ff the SCA canister holds together long enough (in
theory recoverable) or an unsterilized sample scattered in the upper atmosphere if
the canister melts or breaks up. Breakup after entry was considered improbable
enough to be ignored in the most recent iterations of the fault trees and this
section is therefore not used, but is included here for future reference.
Probable
Results: Unbreached SCA Canister - This event is the case where the SCA canister,
made of Inconel 718, is able to stand a high velocity impact. It is dented but the
seals stay intact. The result will be a warm sample that can be found.
Breached SCA Canister - This case is the one where the SCA Canister seals are
broken by the impact. The sample may be simply exposed to air or perhaps
scattered over the surface.
Probabilities:
Unbreached SRC Canister - 0.10 - The canister may be designed to withstand
high impact loads. If the canister is encased in a large amount of low density
debris from the SRC, then it may hit at a low enough velocity that it remains
intact, however this is assumed to be unlikely.
Breached SRC Canister - 0.90 - Impact at high velocity will probably break the
seals.
6.26 Event: Perigee Raise Maneuver - Once the aerocapture maneuver is complete, the
perigee of the orbit must be raised. If this is not done, the orbit will decay shortly,
probably within the next orbit or two. See the table is section 6.24 for an idea of
how fast orbits with low perigee decay.
Possible
Results: Nominal - Perigee is raised out of the atmosphere as planned.
Fails (Entry) - Without the perigee raise maneuver, the vehicle will enter and
impact the surface of the Earth within an orbit or two.
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Probabilities:
Nominal - 0.9999 - This bum usesthe SRChydrazinesystemand is assumedto
have a high level of redundancyin thrusters, etc. This number is subject to
dispute.
Fails (Entry) - 0.0001 - The residual.
6.27 Event: First Propulsive EOI Burn - For the propulsive capture case, given the con-
figuration described in section 3.2, spinning two-stage solids, the first bum uses
four STAR 14A small solid rocket motors, spinning around an axis to level out
thrust inequalities. The second stage uses two STAR 14As. First stage consists of
the bum of the first four and release of the four with pyro units. Other designers
have proposed using small liquid motors to accomplish the same task.
The SRC is also spun up by the ERV. Therefore, 7 events must happen, the ERV
must be properly oriented, the SRC spun up and then released, and the four STAR
14As must fire. The staging is considered part of the second bum event however,
because failure to stage will probably result in a high elliptical parking orbit.
Possible
Results: Nominal Burn - The four first stage motors all bum nominally.
accurately pointed, spun up, and released.
The vehicle is
Failures Resulting in a Flyby - The SRC could be improperly oriented, or not
spun up. Failure to spin up would result in an improper orientation and probably
tumbling at the time of the bum, or in effect, no bum. Failure of one of the
motors to burn might also result in tumbling.
Failures Resulting in a Capture or Entry - There are undoubtedly some failure
modes resulting in an Earth entry (an unlucky orientation failure at spinup, and a
failure to sense it and stop the burn), or in capture into a high ellipse, but these are
assumed to be of such low probability that they can be ignored here.
Probabilities:
Nominal Burn - 0.9993 - Seven events, an orientation, a spinup, a pyrotechnic
release, and four motor firings, all with a 0.9999 reliability result in a (0.9999)^7
reliability when required to all work. The actual reliability of the motor should be
acquired.
Failures Resulting in a Flyby - 0.0007 - The residual.
6.28 Event: Second Propulsive EOI Burn - This follows the first bum of four STAR 14As.
The four spent motors must be staged and the last two STAR 14As must bum to
complete the insertion into low Earth orbit. Six things must happen.
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Possible
Results: Nominal Burn - The four spent motors stage, and the two remaining motors bum
without incident. The vehicle is then inserted into a low Earth orbit on the order
of 500 km circular (270 re'n).
Failure to Stage or Burn - Failure to stage or bum should result in placement of
the vehicle in an elliptical orbit. It is assumed the first stage bum will place the
vehicle in an elliptical orbit. The second stage bum is needed to reduce the
apogee of the ellipse to within range of the OMV. It is assumed that any failure in
the second stage bum will result in the vehicle being out of range of the OMV.
This assumption requires analysis to verify. The orbit will have a perigee around
500 km but with any one of a variety of apogees. Orbital lifetime can be from a
few years on up.
In the fault tree and calculations it is assumed that the lifetime will be such that
the vehicle will re-enter the Earth's atmosphere before it can be recovered. On the
other hand, given adequate orbital life time, recovery may be possible. It will
probably require an upper stage such as the Centaur or IUS matched with an
OMV or other remotely controlled terminal docking device.
Probabilities:
Nominal Burn - 0.9994 - Given six events, four pyro firings for staging and two
motor bums, all assumed to have a reliability of 0.9999 (Vaughn and Graves,
1988 on pyros), the probability of all these happening is (0.9999)^6 = 0.9994.
Failure to Stage or Burn - 0.0006 - The residual. Any failure in the six events is
assumed to result in placement in an orbit the OMV cannot reach and eventual
uncontrolled entry.
6.29 Event: Despin - For the propulsive capture option, following the two EOI bums dis-
cussed above, the SRC must be despun to allow capture by the OMV. "Yo-yos"
or weights on a string are deployed and then cut away to decrease the angular
momentum of the SRC and get the spin rate down to 5 or 6 rpm. Failure to
despin, or to cut away the yo-yos is assumed to make rendezvous with the OMV
not possible.
Possible
Results: Nominal Despin - The SRC is despun and the yo-yos cut away without incident.
Failure to Despin or Cut Away Yo-Yos - This failure results in a high spin rate,
or a low spin rate with weights on strings spinning around. In either case, the
OMV is assumed to be unable to capture the capsule. The orbital lifetime for a
low circular orbit in the 230 to 270 nm range is on the order of 6 months to a year
for high solar flux. A second or third try with improvised grabbing equipment
may be possible after an initial failure.
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Probabilities:
Nominal Despin - 0.9997 - A command must release the yo-yos and one, maybe
two pyros must fire to the cut them away. Assuming a probability of 0.9999 for
each event, (0.99997B = 0.9997.
Failure to Despin or Cut Away Yo-Yos - 0.0003 - The residual.
6.30 Event: Shuttle Ascent - for Shuttle recovery, the Shuttle must ascend to the parking orbit
within a given time frame defined by the life of the sample power supply and RCS
fuel, ff the sample is to be kept cold. If the sample is to be recovered at all, the
Shuttle must get it before its orbit decays. For a lower Shuttle orbit (250 nm) at
high sunspot times, this time period may be from less than a year to over two
years, depending on the solar flux. See the decay and sunspot plots in the
Conclusions and Recommendations section (11.0). The last solar maximum was
around 1979-82. The high sunspot part of the 11 year cycle lasts three or four
years. Plus 22 years (two cycles) gives us a maximum in 2001-2004. If the
mission is launched in 1998 and lasts three years, it will return in 2001, putting it
on the upswinging edge of high solar activity, expanded atmospheres, and fast
orbital decay.
Possible
Results: On-Time Ascent - The Shuttle ascends to the parking orbit of the vehicle on time,
probably somewhere between 0.1 and 90 days after the arrival of the sample in
Earth orbit. It is not yet clear that the sample can keep cold for 90 days in low
Earth orbit, unless it is powered and controlled the whole time.
Late Ascent - This would be ascent after the sample had mn out of power or RCS
fuel and therefore lost temperature control. This would be something over 90
days after the vehicle enters the parking orbit.
No Ascent - Due to a 51L type failure, the Shuttle fleet is grounded for a long
period of time, making a flight within the orbital lifetime of the capsule (6 months
to several years) not possible. The capsule would therefore enter uncontrolled.
The Russians or a CERV system might be able to back up the Shuttle, or a longer
life parking orbit could be used.
Probabilities:
On-Time Ascent - 0.94 - Even before the Challenger accident, the NSTS program
had a serious problem meeting schedules. The simple ascent success record for
the program is 96 % (based on 25 flights). See Table 6.30-1 below for data on
other vehicles. The overall average is roughly 91% see ascent success. The on-
time record for given payloads is much worse, but was not calculated here. More
analysis could probably quantify the record in detail. More analysis of the MRSR
orbital vehicle is also required to determine how long it can maintain power,
attitude control, and altitude, waiting for a launch. The longer this is, the better
the probability of making the launch becomes.
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Table 6.30-1, Launch Vehicle Ascent Success Probability
(On-time performance not considered) (Simanis
88-2627, 1988)
and Gubby, AIAA paper
Araine - 81% in 21 missions
Arias - 80% in 67 mission, 90% in last 20 missions
Delta - 93% in 182 missions, 96% in last 20 missions
Long March - 88% in 16 missions
Titan - 96% in 137 missions, 90% in last 20 missions
Shuttle - 96% in 25 missions
Proton - 92%, oper. vehicle only, 85% - Proton family
Overall average - 91.4% in 447 missions
No Ascent - 0.02 - If the Shuttle has a 0.99 chance of successful ascent, then five
missions have a 0.95 chance of all being successful. In other words, ff the
"window" for a 5 I-L type accident resulting in no recovery is within five missions
before the scheduled recovery launch, then the chance of it happening is around
5%. This assumes a 99 % ascent success rate for one launch. The demonstrated
rate for the Shuttle is 96 %. For all other launch vehicles, U.S. and foreign, the
ascent success rate is in the range of 90 %, based on many hundreds of launches.
None do better than 96 %. Thus the 2 % chance of no ascent may be optimistic.
On the other hand, it is hoped that special efforts will be continued which make
the Shuttle program significantly safer and more reliable than other launch vehicle
programs flown to date.
Late Ascent - 0.04 - The residual.
6.31 Event: Shuttle Rendezvous and RMS Capture - Following a successful ascent, the
Shuttle must rendezvous with and capture the SRC. The rendezvous is a compli-
cated (10 bums), but a well understood and practiced maneuver.
Possible
Results: Nominal Rendezvous and Capture - Rendezvous and RMS capture
placement in a canister pallet are accomplished without incident.
and
Failure to Rendezvous or Capture - Due to failure of some system, perhaps one
requiting immediate deorbit, such as a pressure vessel leak of significance or fuel
cell problems, the sample is not captured.
Probabilities:
Nominal Rendezvous and Capture - 0.999 - Given a successful ascent, the
Orbiter is redundant in almost all crucial systems. Even the RMS may possibly be
backed up by an EVA crewman with a manned maneuvering unit, as has been
demonstrated for a much larger communications satellite recovery.
Failure to Rendezvous or Capture - 0.001 - The residual
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6.32 Event: Orbiter Handling - For the cases in which the sample is recovered directly by the
Space Shuttle Orbiter remote manipulator system, the SCA will probably be
removed from the SRC in the payload bay and repackaged in a sturdier container.
A pallet such as proposed for the Freedom Space Station repackaging (see Figure
3.6-1) may be appropriate. Once the payload bay doors are closed, active thermal
control may be required to keep the sample at -40 ° C. Two failures of signifi-
cance are possible, loss of thermal control, and contamination of the orbiter. The
contamination of the orbiter case is ignored here, to simplify some, and because it
is felt to be improbable. The RMS could do all the sample manipulation and even
leave the tip or part of the RMS that touches the SRC and SCA in the SRC
canister.
Possible
Results: Nominal - The SCA is repackaged without incident.
Loss of Temperature Control - Due to an orbiter or pallet systems failure, the
sample is not kept cold during entry and landing.
Probabilities:
Nominal - 0.999 - This is an estimate subject to dispute.
Loss of Temperature Control - 0.001 - The residual.
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7.0 Detailed Comparison of Failure Probabilities
Table 7.0-1 is a summary of the results of the probability calculations for the various options.
Table 7.0-2 breaks down the numbers into even more detail. The first column in Table 7.0-1 is
the sum of the second and third columns. It is the probability of returning the sample with some
chance of it being too warm. The container breached column in Table 7.0-1 is the sum of the
third through the sixth columns in Table 7.0-2. The container breached column represents all
those failures that release the Mars sample or some small fraction of it into the Earth's biosphere.
To get a more detailed breakdown of the results, we must retum to the fault tree figures and their
spreadsheet summary nmnbers for each branch or path in section five.
Table 7.0-1, Summary of Risk Calculation Results
(from Mid-Course to touch down)
Option Sample 100% Sample Container Sample
Returned Success Degraded Breached Lost
Direct Entry 98.15 97.64 0.55 0.45 1.36
Prop. Capture 96.69 90.38 6.31 0.74 2.57
to Space Sta.
Aerocapture to 96.68 89.61 7.07 1.66 1.66
to Space Sta.
Aerocapture 96.71 91.72 4.99 1.62 1.66
to Shuttle
Includes everything from a broken seal to the sample spread in the upper atmosphere. Also
includes a lost unsterilized sample on Earth in a sealed container. This is the sum of the
third through the sixth column in Table 7.0-2 on the next page.
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Table 7.0-2,
Option
Risk Calculation Results, Detailed Breakdown
(All numbers in % )
100% Degraded Canister Can/ste_
Success Sample Breached Breached
(Sample re- (Sample
covered or destroyed)
intheory
recoverable)
Direct Entry 97.64 0.55 0.21 0.011
Space Sta.
Contaminated
with Maxs
dust
Umteriliz. Sterfliz. Lost Permanent
Lost Sample Lost Sample Sample Orbit
(On Earth) (On Earth) (In Space)
0.232 0.034 1.32
Aerocapture 89.61
to Station
Propulsive 90.38
Capture to Station
7.07 0.70 0.038 0.096
6.31 0.001 0.643 0.097
0.817 0.145 1.026 0.495
1.962 0.609
Acrocaptur¢ to 91.72
Shuttle
4.99 0.73 0.039 0.852 0.149 1.026 0.495
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8.0 Sensitivity Analysis
The results of the fault tree analysis presented in sections 5 and 6 are the same as those of the
simple mission complexity analysis given in section 4. Both types of analysis conclude that the
direct entry option is the most likely to be successful. However, the estimates of probability of
the various off-nominal results of each event presented in section 6 may be in error by as much
as a factor of ten. Therefore a sensitivity analysis was run on the fault trees to see if the
conclusions would be changed if any of the estimates were significantly in error.
Sensitivity to both increases and decreases in failure probability for each event was evaluated. A
complete probability analysis, actually the spread sheet for each fault tree, was recalculated after
increasing each probability estimate for each off-nominal result by a factor of ten. Other runs
raised the probability of each nominal event to 1.0 to essentially remove that event from the
calculation. The results of these calculations are presented in Tables 8.0-1 through 8.0-4 in
compressed form. The following figures show the sensitivity results in an easier to read format.
Figure 8.0-1 shows a plot of the Probability of 100% success versus the probability of canister
breach for all runs increasing and decreasing the probabilities. Note that the extreme points
occur for all options except direct entry. Figure 8.0-2 is a close up of the previous figure. Note
that with the exception of two cases, the direct entry cases all form a cluster with a probability of
100% success of about 97.5% and a probability of canister breach of less that 1/2%. In order to
clarify this point Figure 8.0-3 shows only the direct entry points. Thus the inference of the
previously presented analysis that the direct entry method is preferred is confmned. The better
performance of direct entry is not sensitive to the specific values of the probability estimates.
Figures 8.0-5 through 8.0-23 are bar graphs showing in graphical form the effect of varying the
individual probabilities. These plots show that only 15 of the 32 different entry events produce a
significant effect when probabilities are raised or lowered. Significant effect is defined here as
producing a change greater than roughly 30% of the baseline case in the probability of mission
success, breach of sample, etc. Table 8.0-5 shows these fifteen events and the options that they
affect.
Table 8.0-6 shows a somewhat different list of key results compiled by examining the paths or
branches in the fault trees that contributed the most to failure probabilities for the various
options. The results are shown in Table 8.0-6 with probabilities.
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Table 8.O-l, Sensitivity Analysis for Direct Entry
lay Probabilities
100t Canister
Item Chanoed Factor Success Success Stench legrade Lost Sam.
none 98.15 57.14 0.45 0.55 l.li
t Kid C. |.1 Nigh G xlO 58.10 51.55 l.Jl 1.55 1.4|
2 Hid C. |.I Hiss Size sis 10.15 11.15 0.41 0.50 10.23
3 Hid C. i.l Semis. t 55.11 01.12 l.gi 0.51 I.lt
( Irk-up 1.2 unseal, t 51.15 1ill 0.45 0.55 1.32
5 Irk-up 6.2 Stel. t 51.15 gl.tl 0.44 0.55 1.31
i hut 1.3 (or: I rio 58.15 57.14 0.45 8.55 1.36
7 aatt t.3 )oz= 2 t 58.15 57.14 0.15 8.55 1.36
I Ill loin i.4 Falls t 58.20 57.51 O.ll 0.55 1.31
$ IlV Bile 1.4 lomln, t 58.15 51.64 0.45 0.55 1.)l
10 Unc. int. 1.5 Irk. up eL0 51.08 tT.il 0.13 d.14 1.55
Ll Uuc. Int. 1.5 lenin, t |1.21 |1.t1 0.11 0.51 1.33
12 NoCh Imp l,i Intact t gl,)0 gLl4 d,)i I,fi 1,3|
L3 No Ch Imp l.t Breached t 51.53 57.|4 0.71 0.15 1.31
14 Sic. NoI |.7 Lout t 57.03 57.14 0.71 0.25 1.3t
15 Sic. No I 1.7 Found t 58.42 57.i0 0.22 0.78 1.36
16 Sic. in I 1.1 Lost xll 58.15 57.11 0.15 0.55 1.)t
17 Sic. in I |.1 Found e 58.15 57.61 0.45 0.55 l.]l
11 nv sop i.0 rails lid 51.15 57.25 0.41 0.51 1.|1
15 ItV Sop 1.8 hmin. t 58.23 5Ll! 0.15 0.55 1.32
20 Ill Int. Lg Iigh Skip z10 51.81 51.21 0.45 0.54 4.03
21 eli Int. Lg ligh-G xlO 54.13 51.42 4.34 2.|1 1.55
12 eli ht. 1.5 Iomia. t 58,55 51.|2 0.02 0.33 1.03
21 Ben. Coy. 6.11 Fails xlO IL05 57.25 0.51 0.10 l.)t
24 Sum.Coy. i.U NonLn. t 51.21 57.11 d.4l 0.53 1.1i
25 Digs. Sup 1.12 rails xl0 51.15 5114 0.45 1.55 l.)t
21 ergo. De0 |.12 lomin, t 51.15 57.64 0.15 0.55 I.li
27 Hales Dep 6.13 rails xlO 58.15 57.60 0.45 0.55 1.36
28 Halos De0 6.13 Ionia. t 58.15 57.14 0.45 0,55 1.36
25 tic hat. 6.14 Fails xlO 50.15 51.55 0.15 3.20 1.16
30 Air hat. 6.14 lenin, t 58.15 57.51 0.45 0.26 1.16
31 tizcft La 1.15 Chrashes xll 51.19 57.64 0.45 0.55 1.16
32 tircft La |.15 Joule. t 58.15 57.64 0.45 0.55 1.36
33 tizcft Cz t.16 Con. blk, xlO 54.15 57.64 0.45 0.55 1.36
)l Iircft CI t.l| mot broke t 51.15 57.64 0.45 0.55 1.36
15 Gznd, lee 6.11 Slav t 58.15 54.55 0.45 3.20 1.36
36 Used. Sos l.L7 hnin. t 58.15 57.53 0.45 0.26 1.36
e Probabilities Iaieed to 1
%Chanoo
1001 CaoieteE
Item Changed Factor SuccessSuccessNEeach Degrade Lost Sa
none 0.11 0.01 Lid 0.00 0.00
1 Hid C. t.l NighG xll -0.05 -1.05 i.17 0.00 4.41
2 NLdC, i,l NLsslart xLO -5,00 -5,00 -I,45 -g,05 itl,2L
] NId C. i.l hnin. t 1.01 1.10 2.22 1.12 -71.51
4 Irk-up 6.2 Uustel. t O.00 0.00 1.85 0.00 -2.54
5 elk-up 6.2 Star. t LOS 0.11 -2.22 0.00 0.14
| NeSt 6.3 (oI= I Ill 0.00 0.00 0.00 O,O0 0.00
7 latt |.) )oI= I t O.Oi 0.11 O.OI 0.00 0.00
1 IHVBurn 1.4 Fails t 0.0I O.00 6.|7 1.12 -2.54
5 IlY luxn |.4 hmin. t i.10 Lid Log 0.00 0.00
II Unc. tat. 6.5 Irk. uP xL0 -O.IL I.Ol -2167 -20.10 16.51
11 One. Int. 6.5 Ionim. t 0.02 0.00 4.ig 3.64 -2.21
1| No Ch Imp 6.6 Intact t O.U 0.OO -24.44 20.00 030
13 NoCh Imp |.6 hunched t -0.26 0.00 57.70 -47.27 S.SO
1| SIc. |o | 6.7 Lost t -0.2_ 0.00 57.7S -47.27 0.00
15 Sic. no x 6.7 round t 0.23 O.00 -51.11 41.82 0.00
16 Sic. in I |.7 Lost nil LOS 0.00 i.00 O.00 0.00
17 Sic. it I 6.7 round t 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 o.oo
11 sly sep |.S Falls xlO -0.15 -0.16 4.44 L.12 2).53
15 UV See i.I lenin, t L04 0.14 0.iS 0.01 -1.54
20 01I Int. 1.5 Nigh Skio xl0 -3.44 -3.45 1.00 -1.82 15132
21 DII Int. [.5 ligh-g xlO -4.24 -137 173.33 374.55 16.51
22 Oil Int. |.5 North. t 0.7| 1.00 -55.56 -41.00 -24.26
23 lem. Coy. 6.11 Fails xlO -S.10 -0.36 24.44 45.45 0.00
24 Son. Coy. 6.11 Semis. t 0.02 O.0l -2.22 -3.64 Lit
15 Digs. Sup 6.12 Fails xlO 0.00 O.0O O.00 0.00 0.00
26 Urge. Oopt.12 hmJu. t O.O0 O.O0 O.00 0.00 0.01
21 Hales Oep6.13 Fails xlJ O.OO 0.00 0.00 O.0O 0.00
21 Hales Dep6.13 Benin. t 0.00 0.SO 0.00 O.00 O.dO
25 Air Seat. 6.14 Fails IS0 O.00 -2.71 0.00 481.82 O.i0
10 ALI Suit. |.14 hill. i 0.00 0.]0 0.00 -52.11 O.O0
31 tircft La 6.15 Chlasbes xl0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1! tircft La 6.15 lull. t i.0i g.i0 0.00 0.00 0.00
]3 elicit Cl 6.16 Con. brk. xli 0,00 0.00 0.00 i.00 0.00
34 elicit Cr i.li not bloke t 0.00 d.01 O.OO 0.00 0.00
35 Grnd. hs 6.11 Slum t 0.00 -7.71 0.00 411.82 0.00
]l GInd. tee 6.17 lenin, t 0.00 J.lS 0.SO -51.11 0.00
O0
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Table 8.0-2,
mm m mm mm mm m mm__
Sensitivity Analysis for Aerocapture to Freedom Space Station
mm m m m m mmmm m m
Icy fishabilities
lOOt Caoistet S.S.
Item Cbanqed racist SuccessSuccessiteacked Oe9(adedLost Sau.Contam. re/m Orb.
none 56.i8 45.61 1.5i 1.01 1.11 0.1| 0.45
1 lid ¢. i.l iigb-G xl0 50.55 15.51 1.51 7.00 1.11 0.10 0.15
) lid C. i.l liss tart xI0 81.51 81.55 1.41 i.¢1 10.O7 0.05 0.45
) Old C. (.1 hmin. t 57.06 50.52 1.51 1.11 0.1! 0.I0 0.50
4 Bet-up 5.2 Ouster. t i5.ii lIAr l.i( 7.i7 1.07 L10 0.41
5 Bet-up t.l Stir. I 5i.(I It.St 1.51 1.07 1.11 0.10 0.t)
( |ate (.3 (or: 1 zL0 t(.(I 15.|1 1.50 1.11 1.11 0.10 0.15
7 Slit (.3)o[: 2 t 5|.68 15.(1 1.56 1.01 1.11 0.10 1.15
I SlY Suto (.4 Fulls t 50.05 IS.St L.SI l.Ol 1.14 0.10 0.15
5 iiY Norm (.4 lomLu. , 50.08 85A1 1.55 1.07 1.17 0.10 0.45
10 Uuct[i. I (.5 Steep sit 56.15 I).iL l.lL (.(I 1.00 0.1O 0.41
11 Uuctrl. | (.5 Impact t 5G.ll i5.(1 1.(1 i.11 1.01 0.10 0.45
12 h Ch. lm (.( Breached t 91.01 IS.St 1.21 1.41 1.11 |.10 0.49
13 No Cb. Im (.t 1utact t 55.15 15.01 2.31 i.i5 1.11 0.10 0.45
14 Sic. h I (.1 Lost t 55.50 85.(1 2.31 i.25 1.13 0.10 0.t5
15 Src. So S |.7 round m 91.45 ll.(l I.TI 7.45 1.11 0.10 O.fl
10 tiV Sop (.I rails xli 10.15 45.15 1.51 7.1( 1.11 0.10 0.45
ll Itv Sep LJ hmin. t 50.1| 45.(5 1.55 7.01 1.1l 0.11 0.45
18 &eeocap t.10 |stir Ix. xI0 51.33 15.51 1.50 (.10 1.13 0.05 4.55
15 _e[ocip (.10 Io lilt xlO )).ll 85.51 0.31 0.14 1.30 0.05 0.45
20 Aetocap (.10 IomJl. t 51.50 50.52 1.10 5.58 1.15 0.10 0.00
11 Oib. l. (.If failure x10 50.11 11.10 lag 7.43 1.55 0.10 0.15
12 0t5. S. (.ll Iomln. t 5113 it.10 1.55 7.01 1.13 0.10 0.45
23 Orb1i. (.15 Crash 110 50.07 10.10 1.5( 7.41 1.11 Lie 0.45
14 orb lu. (.15 lomio, t 5|.10 05.10 1.55 7.01 1.13 0.10 0.41
25 Orb. bet (.)O Oisteril. xli 50.(( 15.(1 1.(| 7.i5 1.14 0.10 0.45
2( Orb. bri (.20 Steril. t 5(.(0 05.|1 1.55 7.07 1.11 0.10 0.15
21 Pal.bri |.21CanRrck zlS 5|.07 85.01 1.55 1.0G 1.11 0.I0 0.45
li Pal. bet (.11 h Itch t 5(.il 15.51 1.55 1.07 1.11 0.10 0.45
it S.S. fro. (.22 rimr rail sis 50.1) it.)( 1.55 10.)1 l.ll 0.10 0.15
30 S.S. Pro. (.12 Cuntam. x10 55.30 IS.)( 1.55 7.02 1.14 0.5i 0.45
31 S.S. rio. (.11 nomin, t 50.05 15.51 1.5| (.11 1.17 0.10 0.45
)Z ONY0ep. |.Z) Fails xi0 50.05 4(.70 1.55 49.55 1.11 0.10 0.45
)30SV Dep. 5.2) Slow xlO 51.10 ll.02 7.00 5.i( 1.44 0.05 0.45
14 ONVDip. |.23 lomJn, t 51)4 55.04 0.54 2.00 1.11 i.lO 0.45
]50NV Nec. (.24 Slur xl0 50.51 SIAl 1.55 15.30 1.17 0.10 0.45
10 ONVtec. Lit rails xle 50.8| IL.)7 7.00 5.45 1.50 0.05 0.15
)7SlYNec. (.2¢ Nomlu. t 57.34 51.45 0.50 5.J5 1.1) S.JJ 0.45
t rtobabLIlties raised to 1
t Change
lOOt Canister S.S.
Item Cbailed Factor Success Success keoched DegradedLost Sum. Coitus. Petm Orb
none 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 |.00 0.00
1 Nld C. (.1 lisk-G xll -i.0t -0.05 1.21 -1,14 5.58 0.00 i.Si
2 NLd¢, (,L NLsstart xL0 -5,00 -I,55 -8,51 -5,05 701,il -10,00 -I,L(
) Old ¢. (.1 Nomin. * 1.01 1.01 O.(i 0.55 -it.it 0.SO 2.Oi
4 art-up 5.2 Ouster. t 0.00 LOS 5.fl O.OO -1.55 0.00 LOS
5 irk-up 1.2 Stir. t |.O0 0.S0 -2.5| 0.SO 2.50 0.00 LOS
( SiR (.) (o[: L xli S.00 0.O0 0.O0 0.00 O.i0 LOS 0.0O
7 Bait 1.) )or: l t 0.00 O.li LOS 0.00 LOS 0.00 0.0!
| NOVBurs 1.4 rails t 0.01 0.00 1.iS 0.14 -2.5( 0.00 O.O0
5 SlY loin 1.1 hmln. t Log 0.00 -0.(4 0.00 1.00 0.|O 0.SO
LI Unctfl, I t.5 Siilp xL0 -lAg L0S -21,15 -5,51 70,54 Log g,gg
It Uuctil. I t.5 Impact t 0.0l I,Ol ).11 0.51 -1.it L0I 0.00
ll In Ch. IIl.( Breached t 0.)i 0.00 -ll.li 1.55 Lie 0.00 I.O0
l) No ¢5. Im i.( Intact t -i.15 0.00 51.51 dial O.O0 0.0O 0.00
14 Sic. meS t.1 Lost t -0.81 O.O0 51.52 -ll.ll -3.42 0.00 0.00
15 Src. No l 5.1 Found t 0.11 0.00 -52.5l 11.l) ).il 0.SO S.OO
10 ISV Sop 1.4 rails xl0 -0.34 -O.)( 0At -0.14 27.35 0.O0 0.00
11 ItV Sep l.I Nomlo. I i.O| 0.01 -0.(I O.Oi -1.50 0.00 0.00
li &erocap l.lO Surly ix. II0 -1.50 -4.51 -).15 -(.)l -3.42 -10.00 510.10
15 lerocal i.10 In Ixlt sis -1.51 -4.51 ll(.ll 10,55 11.11 -IS.SO 0.00
20 lelocal t.10 hmin. t 0.15 l.Ol -it.l) -L.li -1.11 0,00 -lSO,|i
11 Oib. I. l.il lalllie ill -S.17 -0,51 1.5l 5.05 35.50 0.00 L0I
II Orb. I. 1.11 hill. i 0.05 0.10 -0.(i -0.51 -).il 0.00 0.00
20 Orb Is. (.15 Crass xi0 -i.01 -0.50 0.00 11.)2 0.00 0.00 0.0S
14 Orblu. 1.15 hnLu. t 0.05 0.10 -0.(I -i.51 -).42 0.S0 0.00
25 Orb. brt (.20 Uastetil. xl0 -0.02 0.00 2.50 -0.21 -2.5( 0.01 0.00
1t Oib. hi| (.10 $tazll. t 0.00 0.00 S.SO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
21 lal. bzL (.21 Cao Nrcb xll -0.01 0.00 0.01 -S.14 0.00 0.00 0.S0
28 ral. brk 1.2L 0o BEcb t 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
25 S.S. fro. (.12 limp rail xl0 0.05 -),() -0.(4 i(AI 0.00 0.00 1,0S
)S S.S. t[o. l.ll louisa, xl0 -1.)4 -1.05 -0.t4 -0.11 -l.51 I(0.00 0.00
31 S.S. Pro. (.12 |omLn. t 0.|1 0.41 0.00 -5.05 0.00 S.00 0.01
]20NV lop. (.it rails xl0 g,01 -11,15 -0.t4 007,01 0.00 LOg 0.00
)30NVDep. i.l] Slur xl0 -(.i2 -5.55 )52.5( 05.1| 2).08 -10.00 0.00
04 ONVDip. (.21 NomLu. t 0.(| (,05 -05.71 -11,1L -),42 0,00 0,00
05 OKVhc, 1,11 Slur xl0 -0,11 -5,10 -0,01 111,41 0,10 0,00 0,0S
)( ONYhc, (,11 Falls xl0 -(.02 -5.20 352.5( )1.2) 21,21 -10,00 0,0S
31 ONyNec. t.14 Nomlm. t 0.(I 2.05 -35.11 -11,t5 -3.02 S.S0 0.#!
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Table 8.0-3, Sensitivity Analysis for Aerocapture to Shuttle
lay tzehabLlities
loll Canister
Item Clanged factor Success Success Breached Degrade Lost Sa Pete O[b.
none 5|.11 51.11 l.|l 1.55 1.11 0.15
Bid C. 5.1 Bit latt5 xlO 51.12 51.i3 l.ll 4.55 1.11 0.45
lid C. 1.1 Kiss tart xiO 11.10 11.06 1.00 1.51 10.01 B.05
Hid C. 6.1 Humid. t 51.81 5L|l I.GI 5.0t 0.18 0.50
Irk-up t.| gesteril, t 55.11 !1.11 1.13 1.55 1.01 0.15
Srk-ep |.2 Sterll. t 51.11 51.12 1.55 1.95 1.21 d.t9
Bali t,) (or: 1 xll 51.1l 51.11 l.ll 1.55 1.11 0.tl
Butt L) )or= Z t 55.11 51.1] 1.52 4.55 1.11 0.45
elY Sets 5.0 fails t 55.12 51.12 1.55 5.00 1.11 0.t5
BBYDean 5.4 lot||, t 55.11 51.1] 1.52 1.55 1.11 0.05
gnctzid B 5.5 Irks0 s10 55.51 51.12 1.15 t.55 |.01 0.15
Uoctxld S |.5 Intact t 56.18 51.12 1.51 5.00 1.08 0.05
HeCh Imp 6.6 Intact t 51.08 51.12 1.25 5.35 1.11 0.15
h ChImp Li Breached t 55.85 51.12 2.08 4.14 1.11 0.15
Sic. So Z |.1 Lost t 55.50 51.12 2.08 1.18 1.11 0.05
arc. h I 5.1 round t 51.52 51.12 1.11 5.10 1.22 0.15
SlY Sep t.I railn sis 5|.58 51.55 1.10 0.55 1.50 I.t5
ElY Set 8.1 Ionia. t 51.10 51.15 1.52 1.55 1.1l 0.15
tetocaf Leo Burly Ix. xII 51.32 81.55 1.55 1.11 1.11 1.55
letocup i.li He Hxit xlO 53.80 01.55 1.31 &.25 1.34 0.t5
Aetocap Lit Doalt. u 51.52 51.54 1.5l l.lO l.ti Leo
Orb. I. 5.11 failure xlO 56.15 50.05 1.61 5.31 1.58 0.05
Orb. t. |.11 Iomie. t 56.10 51.81 1.i1 t.55 1.18 0.05
Orbin. 6.15 Crash xlO 58.10 51.15 1.53 5.81 1.11 |.t5
OIb In. 1.15 holD. t 56.11 51.81 l.iZ 1.50 1.11 0.15
Orb. 5tk i.lO Uu_tetil. xlO 51.55 51.1| 1.51 4.91 1.15 0.45
Orb. 5tk t.ll $teril. t 5|.1l 51.12 I.i| 0.55 1.11 0.15
fan. brt 8.21 CanItch. tit IS.tO 51,11 1.|1 t.5l 1,17 8.45
faD. bit 5.21 Degraded t 55.11 51.12 1.51 4.55 1.11 d.il
fee. I 5.15 rails xll 56.55 51.53 1.51 5.01 l.ll 0.15
for. I |.|| lolls, t |111 51.11 1.5l 1.55 1.11 0.05
Shut. lsci.)O Late xlO 55.11 56.55 1.5l 41.12 1.11 1.45
Shut. tsc |.)0 Too Late xlO 84.55 lt.15 11.12 10.11 1.01 0.45
Shut. Lhc 5.30 |omit. t 58.01 51.51 0.35 0.|1 1.10 0.45
Shot. tit i.)l fails xlJ 55.13 50.i5 2.11 5.14 l.Zl 0.45
Shut. DiD [.11 hilt. t 56.11 51.11 1.51 4.58 1.11 0.45
Orb. eat 5.1| leap flit xlO 55.12 50.85 1.11 5.83 1.11 0.45
Orb. Dan 5.)| IomJa. t 55.11 51.11 1.51 t.5O 1.11 0.t1
t frobtbLlities raised to 1
Item Changed Factor
t Ckange
lOOt
SuccessSuccess
Canister
Breached Degrade Lost Sa Pete Oth
none LOt 0.00 O.OO 0.00 1.00 |30
1 Hid C. 5.1 lit Batik xll -0.05 -0.10 1.13 0.00 5.58 0.00
2 Hid C. 5.1 Kiss hit xLO -5.01 -LOt -8.ti -5.01 150.58 -8.15
) Hid C. t.l lOll|, t l.OI l.OO 1.|3 1.00 -80.|2 2.00
I Dtk-eo 5.| Usoteril. t 0.00 O.OO 5.15 0.00 -5.55 0.00
5 Irk-up 5.1 Stecll. t 0.01 O.BI -1.15 d.ll 1.11 1.01
5 Dart 5.3 (or: 1 x10 0.0! 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 Butt L] )or, | t 0.00 O.OO 1.10 0.00 0.01 0.11
I B|V Bars |.1 fails t 1.01 O.O0 1.15 1.20 -15| O.OO
5 SBVBurn 5.0 Nomin. u O.OI O.OO 0.00 Log 0.15 O.O|
10 UocUld8 5.5 kkup x10 -0.1L 0.00 -28.00 -8.03 11.35 0.00
11 Unctrld I 5.5 Intact t 0.15 0.02 3.15 1.00 -1.55 l.lO
13 He Ck lap 5.5 Intact t 0.)1 0.00 -33.3| 1.11 0.10 1.10
13 h Ch Imp 8.5 Breached t -0.80 0.00 53.05 -17.03 0.00 0.00
10 Src. No1 L? Lost t -0.8i 0.01 53.05 -15.l) -).13 0.00
15 Sic. No S 5.1 foeld t 0.1i O.O0 -53.|1 15.31 |.11 J.J|
15 Sir Sep 5.8 rails sin -I.31 -d.)5 1.33 1.|0 28.21 LeO
11 SlY Sup 5,1 lomLe, t 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 -2.55 0.00
II Xetocaf 5.10 laxlf 8x. x10 -1.5i -t.55 -3.1! -4.41 O.OO 510.30
15 tetocaf 5.10 No Bxit xlO -).01 -8.55 155.15 35.35 14.53 0.00
10 lerocap 5.10 hmLe. t 0.8i 1.00 -18.53 -L|O -0.85 -LO0.O0
21 Orb. B. 5.11 failure xlO -0.01 -0.50 3.05 1.11 35.01 1.00
21 Orb. I. 5.11 hilt. t 0.01 0.10 0.|0 0.00 0.15 0.00
33 Orb 1o. 5.15 Crash x18 -0.01 -0.50 0.53 15.43 0.00 101
24 Orb1e. 5.15 lomle, t 0.00 0.10 0.00 -L.80 O.O0 O.O0
25 Orb. brk 5.20 gnsteril, xll -I.O| 0.00 3.15 -0.40 -1.11 0.10
35 O[b. btk 5.20 Stetil. t 0,00 0.00 0.00 O.O0 0.15 0.00
17 fal. brt 5.11 CanItch. xld -0.01 0.80 d.52 -|.20 0.00 0.00
38 fal. btk 5.21 Degraded t 0.00 0,00 O.O0 0.00 l.OI 0.01
25 fee. I 5.25 rails xll -0.05 -O.IO 1.10 0.50 0.15 Log
30 fe[. B 5.25 Iomin. t 0.00 0.00 O,O0 0.0| O.O0 O.O0
)I Shut. isc L)i Late tin i.OI -31.30 0.50 100.01 0.00 0.00
)2 Shut. lsc 5.]0 ?oo 5ate xlO -I115 -L5.15 515.L5 111|1 55.11 0.00
51 Shut. |sc 5.50 lomb. t 1.3i 5.51 -15.55 -51.10 -5.51 0.10
]i Shut. Ill 1.51 fails xll -i.|O -0.50 )3.55 5.01 3.12 0.00
35 Shut. I|l 5.31 Iomiu. t 0.0i 0.10 -).10 -O.|O 0,00 1.00
)5 Orb. Nan 5.52 ?emf fail x10 1.0i -0.50 O.O0 15.1] 0.00 0.00
51 Orb. Has 5,)3 hale. t O,O0 0.10 O.O0 -1.|0 O.O0 0.on
I I I H | i | I
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Table 8.0-4, Sensitivity Analysis for Propulsive Capture to Freedom Space Station
hv )rohabLlI1ies
188t Cauister
ILemChanged Factor Success Success Szcached Degrade Lost 8J 8.S. Co. item Changed rector
none 5i.i5 58.38 1.60 1.31 2.57 0.05
l Hid C. |.1 lit |artb xl0 52.15 86.11 1.15 |.02 5.17 8.05
2 Hid _. i.1 Hiss lark xlO 51.25 1|.37 1.12 t.Sl |.55 0.05
3 HidC. (.I hmim. t 5l.li 51.25 0.51 (.17 l.ll i.IO
I Irk-up t.l UusleriL. t 51.|5 50.31 2.5i i.11 8.|5 0.10
5 Drt-up 6.2 SterLl. t 51.i5 50.]8 8.01 131 3.21 0.10
G Satt |.3 <o[= 1 xl8 51.|5 58.38 0.|0 1.31 2.51 1.10
1 Bats l.] )or: l t 5t.65 50.31 100 l.]l 1.51 0.10
8 SIc. h t 6,1 Lost t 51.13 58.11 1.11 1.]5 2.51 S.10
) Sic. 8o | |.1 Fused l 51.55 50.31 1.|1 6.21 Lit 0.11
10 StY Sep 18 rails xL0 51.33 50.05 8.t! 1.28 2.51 0.10
11 ISV Sup 4.8 hmin. t 56.11 50.42 0.61 i.1l 2.51 0.18
11 Orb. 8. 1.11 hiiute xlO 56.11 15,51 O.i5 6.ii 1.51 0.10
11 OEb. I. 1.18 hiss. t 51.10 50.41 0.il 1.ll 3.53 0.18
10 Orb Is. 1.15 Crash xlO 5|.|8 15.51 0.iS 1.11 2.57 O.1O
15 OrbIn. 1.15 hmim. t 51.15 50.47 O.il 6.33 2.51 O.lS
16 Orb. brk i.I0 Uusluzil. xl0 5|.|7 50.31 0.15 1,15 2.55 8.10
11 Orb. br| 6.28 Steril. t 51.|5 50.38 0.14 6.]1 2.51 0.10
11 Pet. brk ilL Cnmhrch zl0 5|,11 50.18 0.15 |.10 2.51 1.10
15 Pal. b[k i.21 Degraded t 51.55 50.38 1.6! |.31 2,51 0.18
10 S.S. Pin. |.12 Contam. siS 55.11 15.56 0.1i i.35 1.57 0.51
21 S.S. Pro. 1.22 temprail xl8 51.|5 I1.11 1.|4 5.51 2.57 0.10
23 s,s. Pro, |.|2 hmiu. t 5|.18 58.1l 1.|1 5.55 2.57 0.08
21 OHVDeF. 1.23 Slur xlO 51.|l 47.11 0.14 45.57 2.51 O.10
14 sKYDeF. |.21 rail rio 11.58 11.73 lag 6.17 5.17 8.05
15 ONVDeF. l.Z) lomin, t 51.|G 55.15 O.II 1.51 1.14 0.18
16 ONVtec. l.ll Slov xlO 55.15 12.88 0.51 14.|1 2.51 l.lO
11 SHYEtc. 1.24 rails sis 81.50 12.81 3.84 5.12 5.11 0.05
21 OHVtec. 5.20 Iomin. t 51.55 52.12 0.08 5.01 1.14 0.10
25 IoI 11 ill rails sis 55.81 15.81 0.|0 5.17 3.10 0.10
38 |OI 11 5.|1 |olin. t 55.15 50.|0 8.|| 5.11 2.53 0.10
11 IOI 11 1.28 rails zlO gS.IG 15.15 1.11 G,27 2,57 0.I0
32 SOl 12 5.21 hmin. t 55.10 58.13 0.13 5.31 2.53 0.18
13 Desple 5.25 rails xl8 55.13 50,1! 0.11 5.25 2.11 0.18
30 Despiu 5.25 hmiu. t 5i.71 58,11 8,(1 5.11 2.55 O.10
t Probabilities raised to 1
t Chaugu
lOOt CauJsLe[
Success8access8reached Degrade Lost Sa S.S. Co
none 8.80 0.00 0.00 8.00 O.OO 8.18
1 Hid C. t.l Nit Dmrkh xl8 -0.55 -1.55 171.40 -4.58 121.40 0.00
2 Hid C. 5.1 Hiss lark xl0 -4.55 -4.55 -3.13 -4.50 171.58 8.00
3 Hid C. 5.1 helm, t 1.00 1.11 -18.15 0.55 -33.45 11.11
! Stt-up 5.2 Unsterii. t O.OO 8.00 300.08 8.00 -74.11 11.11
5 Sxk-up 5.2 SterLl. t 0.0O 0.80 -51.41 0.08 20.tl 11.11
5 Salt |.3 (or: l xI0 0.01 8.08 0.88 0.OO S.0O 11.11
1 Bats 5.1 )or= 2 e 0.0o 0,80 0.O0 0.01 0.01 11.11
0 s[c. Do | 5,1 Lost t 0.04 0.08 O.O0 0.53 -1.55 ll.Ll
5 Src. No 8 5.1 Posed t -3.83 0.80 0.80 -0.51 1.55 ll.ll
10 SlY Sep 5.1 Pails xlO -8.31 -0.37 8.00 -OAt 13.52 11.11
II SEV8ep 5.1 hmin. t 0.0I 0At 0.00 0.00 -1.55 11.11
12 Orb. I. 5.11 failure xI0 -O.4l -0.50 7.81 5.55 15.55 11.11
13 Orb. I. 5.18 hlJs. t 1.05 0.18 0.08 -001 -1.55 11.11
14 OrbIt. 5,15 ClaSh xl0 -1,01 -0.50 1.55 12.58 0.08 11,11
15 OrbIn. 5.15 Iomim. t 0.00 0.1O 0.00 -1.43 0.08 11.11
15 Orb. brk 5.28 Unsteril. xt0 -8.02 8.00 7.11 -0,]l -8.11 lI.I1
11 Orb.brk 5.20 8te[il. t O.OO 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.01 ll.lI
11 Pal. brk 5.21 Casbzch z10 -O.Ol 0.08 1.55 -0.15 8.00 1L.11
15 Pal. bxk 5.21 Degrnded t O.00 8.00 0.08 0.01 0.O0 11.11
20 S.S. Fro. 5.21 Costam. xlO -8.51 -0.51 0.08 -8.55 0.08 571.71
21 S.S. Pro. 5.22 telp rnil st8 0.80 -3.51 0.00 51.12 0.00 II.II
22 8.8. Fro. 5.22 iomis, t 0.05 0.58 8.08 -5.71 8.80 -180.00
2) OHVDe0. 5,21 Slov x18 -|,01 -41,81 0,00 515,51 0,11 11,11
210HV DeF. 5.23 rsiL x18 -5.05 -5,51 343.15 -2,12 255.11 1,81
25 OHVOep. 6.23 HumJm. t 1.00 5.31 -31.50 -16.07 -28.40 11.11
20 OKVhe. 5.21 Slur xl8 O.OO -5.11 O.00 131.54 8.00 11.11
21 OHViec. 5.2! tails x11 -5.85 -5.10 343.15 -1.11 255.01 0.08
21 OKVtec, 5.21 IomLm, t 1.0O 1.04 -31.51 -1).75 -21.48 II.LI
25 SOl Jl 5.11 hils xl0 -0.53 -I,53 0.00 -0.53 23.10 11.11
]0 SOl Jl 5.21 Somin. t 0.05 0.01 0,00 0.00 -t.55 11,11
31 SOl 12 5.21 rails xl0 -8.55 -0,50 ll,81 -0.5) 15.55 11.11
32 SOl J| 5.2J |slim. t 0.05 0.05 -1.55 0.00 -1.55 11.11
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Figure 8.0-1, Scatter for all Sensitivity Runs (Plot includes all points)
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Figure 8.0-2, Scatter for All Sensitivity Runs (Plot includes most points)
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Scatter for Direct Entry Sensitivity Runs (Plot includes all Direct Entry points)
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Figure 8.0-4, Sensitivity Plot for Direct Entry, Per Cent Change for Lost Sample
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Figure 8.0-5, Sensitivity Plot for Direct Entry, Per Cent Change for Degraded Sample
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Figure 8.0-6, Sensitivity Plot for Direct Entry, Per Cem Change for 100% Success
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Figure 8.0-7, Sensitivity Plot for Direct Entry, Per Cent Change for Canister Breach
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Figure 8.0-8,
800 -
Sensitivity Plot for Aerocapture to the Freedom Space Station Per Cent Changed
for Lost Sample
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Figure 8.0-9, Sensitivity Plot for Aerocapture to the Freedom Space Station, Per Cent Change
for Degraded Sample
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Figure 8.0-10, Sensitivity Plot for Aerocaptum to the Freedom Space Station, Per Cent Change
for 100% Success
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Figure 8.0-11, Sensitivity Plot for Aerocapture to the Freedom Space Station, Per Cent Change
for Canister Breach
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Figure 8.0-12, Sensitivity Plot for Aemcapture to the Freedom Space Station, Per Cent Change
for Station Contamination
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Figure 8.0-L3, Sensitivity Plot for Aerocapture to the Freedom Space Station, Per Cent Change-
for Permanent Orbit
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Figure 8.0-14, Sensitivity Plot for Aerocapture to the Shuttle, Per Cent Change for Lost Sample
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Figure 8.0-15, Sensitivity Plot for Aerocapture to the Shuttle, Per Cent Change for Degraded
Sample
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Figure 8.0-16, Sensitivity Plot for Aerocapture to the Shuttle, Per Cent Change for 100%
Success
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Figure 8.0-17, Sensitivity Plot for Aerocapture to the Shutde, Per Cent Change for Canister
Breached
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Figure 8.0-18, Sensitivity Plot for Aerocapture to the Shuttle, Per Cent Change for Permanent
Orbit
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IFigure 8.0-19, Sensitivity Plot for Propulsive Capture to Freedom Space Station, Per Cent
Change for Lost Sample
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Figure 8.0-20, Sensitivity Plot for Propulsive Capture to Freedom Space Station, Per Cent
Change for Sample Degraded
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Figure 8.0-21, Sensitivity Plot for Propulsive Capture to Freedom Space Station, Per Cent
Change for 100% Success
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Figure 8.0-22, Sensitivity Plot for Propulsive Capture to Freedom Space Station, Per Cent
Change for Canister Breach
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Figure 8.0-23, Sensitivity Plot for Propulsive Capture to
Change in Station Contamination
Freedom Space Station, Per Cent
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Table 8.0-5, The 15 Most Significant Events
Option that has significant sensitivity to the Event:
Event Chapter Direct
Enwy
Mid Course 6.1 X
Break-up 6.2
Uncontroned Entry 6.5
No Chute Impact 6.6
Search for SRC 6.7
Out of Zone landing
ERV Separation 6.8
Direct Entry 6.9 X
Aerocapmre 6.10
Air Snatch 6.14 X
Orbiter Entry 6.18
Space Sta. Proc. 6.22
OMV launch and departure 6.23
OMV Recovery 6.24
Shuttle Ascent 6.30
Shuttle Rendez. and 6.31
Recovery
Aerocap. Aerocap. Propul. Cap.
to Sta. to Shuttle to Sta.
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
121
!
Table 8.0-6, Evems That Dominate Major Paths in the Fault Trees
(Nominal probability estimate shown)
1. Direct Entry
Successful Air snatch - 97%
Nominal Midcom, se - 99%
Nominal Entry - 99%
Breach after no chute impact - 30%
2. Aerocapture to Orbiter
- On-time Shuttle Ascent - 94%
- Nominal Midcourse - 99%
- Nominal Aerocapture - 99%
- Breach after uncontrolled entry - 30%
3. Aerocapture to Freedom Space Station
- OMV launch and deploy on time - 94%
- OMV nominal recovery of SRC - 98%
- Nominal Aerocapmre - 99%
- Nominal Midcourse - 99%
4. Propulsive Capture to Freedom Space Station
OMV launch and deploy on time - 94%
OMV nominal recovery of SRC - 98%
Nominal Aerocapture - 99%
Nominal Midcourse - 99%
Sterilization during uncontrl, entry - 25%
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9.0 Planetary Protection Policy
At the start of this study the authors reviewed a series of documents to try to determine the
official policy of the U.S. government toward return of extraterrestrial materials and possible
back-contamination hazards. The policies for controlling spacecraft outbound from Earth to
other planetary bodies seemed well defined, but the policy with regard to inbound flights were
not adequately defined in the documents reviewed to present either design requirements or
standards by which candidate designs could be evaluated.
Attitudes toward the problem are represented by two extremes:
- There is no life on Mars, don't let this issue impact the program.
- Any risk above zero is unacceptable. The benefits to the public are not worth any risk.
The authors of this study tend to be somewhere in the middle, leaning toward minimizing risk.
Although the probability of living material on Mars is viewed as vanishingly small, the possibili-
ty does exist. The probability that life previously existed on Mars when it had liquid water on
the surface and a more hospitable climate is much higher. One of the principle motivations to
pursue a Martian sample is to fred evidence of that life. It is physically impossible to return a
sample in which to study past life which is 100% certain to be free of current Mars life, should it
exist. Zero risk is not possible for a sample return mission. We must be willing to accept a
small risk. If there is Martian life, it cannot be studied without some risk, but there are poten-
tially great benefits from this study.
The precedents for handling extra-terrestrial materials were set in the Apollo program where
biohazards were considered. Zero risk was not achievable though it was sought. The material
was simply handled with equipment and procedures similar to those used to confine known
deadly terrestrial pathogens in biological containment laboratories. The sample was isolated
biologically as were all that came in contact with it. Such procedures can be implemented at a
modest cost relative to other aspects of the mission.
There are other precedents in the handling of known terrestrial pathogens such as the remaining
viable smallpox virus. Keeping some smallpox virus available for study involves some small
risk to the population of Earth as a whole. However, the study of the material has been deemed
to outweigh any risks associated with its presence.
What is an acceptable risk? Another way tO phrase the question is - what is a risk the American
public will accept. It is worthwhile mentioning that all previous sample returns (6 Apollos and 3
Lunas) were direct entries with risks on the order of or greater than those tabulated for direct
entry in this report. Convincing arguments have been presented that several meteorites found on
Earth came from Mars. These meteorites have fallen in all regions of the Earth including India
France, Antarctica, and other locations. All arrived via direct entry and none have induced any
pathologic symptoms.
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Table 9.0-1 tabulates typical risks faced by the public in everyday life. An acceptable risk in the
high range is roughly one in one million. This is the chance of a fatal accident on a commercial
aircraft flight or roughly the chance of an individual getting struck by lightning in a year. The
authors propose this as a fLrst cut acceptable risk for releasing Martian life on Earth, to be
weighed against the benefits.
Table 9.0-1, Typical Risks
(Hurt, 1978)
- 1/4,500 - risk of death/year/indiv, in auto accid.
- I/2,000,000- risk of death/year/indiv, from lightning
- 1/13,000 - risk of death/year/indiv, from fall
- 1/300 - risk of death/year/indiv, from smoking
Given that the risk of breach of container in the Earth's biosphere is calculated as roughly 1/2%
or 5 in 1,000 for direct entry (the best option) it must be reduced to approach I in 1,000,000.
One reduction factor for this risk could be a multiplier applied for the probability that Martian
life exists, will be found in the sample in quantity, can survive transport, can reproduce and do
damage on Earth, etc. This all seems unlikely at the moment leading the authors to propose a
1/100 or 1/1,000 multiplier. More study of this issue by an exobiologist is needed.
Other risk reduction measures are proposed in the next chapter. More work and the software
developed in this study can quantify these effects on the risk of container breach.
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10.0 Risk Reduction Measures
The following measures can significantly reduce the risk of sample canister breach and of back-
contamination of Earth.
l. Redundant air snatch aircraft will increase the probability of a successful air snatch from
97% to 99.91%. This does not affect the chance of container breach, since the container
will be designed to land unharmed with a chute, but the risk of loss of thermal control will
be significantly reduced.
. Retain ability to miss Earth as long as possible - just before entry or ERV separation. Any
failure that might increase the risk of container breach would be cause to fly by.
. Redundancy in all critical systems in the ERV and SRC. For risk of canister breach, a
highly internally redundant single mission is better than a dual mission. A completely dual
pair of missions may get the chance of mission success from 80% up to 96% but it will
double the risk of canister breach.
. Toughen the SCA for no seal loss in a no chute impact. Though likely to be expensive in
terms of weight, this a highly testable option. Low weight options, such as placing the
sample in some kind of rugged, flexible bag may also work.
. Flight test of the direct entry or aerocapture system would increase confidence in single
point failure items such as the thermal protection systems.
. Toughen the SCA to insure sterilization in an entry breakup. A rugged SCA will retain the
sample long enough for it to be sterilir.ed by the heat of re-entry in a break-up situation.
. Add a sterilization system in the SCA. A chemical heater (phosphorus grenade?) would be
placed in the SCA to be ignited in the event of unplanned failures. The sample would be
heat sterilized.
. Add equipment (TV cameras?) to monitor the sterile transfer in Mars orbit. Any anomaly
would result in cancellation of the sample return.
. If any sign of life is seen on Mars, cancel the sample return until more secure systems are
built.
L0. Long life parking orbit - at least 650 km (350 nm). The OMV can retrieve 800 Ibm from
approximately 1,850 km (I,000 ran) orbits. This would get the orbital lifetime up to tens
of years, allowing many chances to go get the sample. This will significantly reduce the
risk of canister breach for the Earth orbit options, but will not affect the risk of degraded
sample or overall mission success much.
Figure 10.0-1 and 10.0-2 show decay times for ballistic numbers typical of aerocapture and
propulsive capture options.
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11.
12.
The decay times are very much a function of the solar flux/sunspot cycle and the expansion
of the atmosphere that results from high flux/sunspot times which occur every eleven years
and last for three or four years. The last few peak years have been 1948, 1958, 1969, and
1980. 1980 + 22 = 2002. If the mission departs in 1998, it will return roughly three years
later in 2001. It will therefore arrive as sunspot activity is rising toward the peak, at the
start of 3 or 4 years of high flux and expanded atmosphere. Lines number 3 and 4 in the
figures are therefore applicable for lifetime prediction.
Redundant means to retrieve the SRC from orbit, such as an expendable with an SRC
catcher of some kind would up the chance of retrieval success into the 99% range, but at
great expense.
Permanent basing of an OMV at the Freedom Space Station will remove part of the ascent
problem. The retrieval will be less dependant on an on-time launch, however a 51L
accident may put the station out of action anyway. The crew may return to Earth in an
emergency return device.
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11.0 Conclusions and Recommendations
The followingconclusionsand recommendations resultedfrom thisstudy:
I. The direct entry option is the best choice of the four in all areas of comparison studied
here. It has the best chance of 100% mission success, least chance of canister breach and
loss of thermal control. It is the least expensive, has less program risk and is by far the
simplest. AU previous sample returns (6 Apollos and 3 Lunas) were direct entry missions
and the public did not object. Other comparison areas, such as weight, were not addressed.
. Measures can be taken to significantly reduce the risk of canister breach below the 0.45%
calculated for direct entry. These include:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
Redundant subsystems in the ERV and SRC
Dual main and drogue chutes (already included in the calculations)
SCA capable of maintaining seals in a no chute impact
Ability to flyby Earth until ERV separation
Flight test for entry vehicle
Redundant air snatch aircraft
. Other measures that can reduce the probability of back-contamination for all options
include:
a) Cancellationof sample returnportionof themission ifany signsof lifearefound on
Mars.
b) Equipment (cameras) to monitor the sterile transfer in Mars orbit. Any detected
anomaly in the sterile transfer process would result in leaving the sample in Mars
orbit.
. If the options using Earth orbit parking are used, use a parking orbit with a long decay
time, in the range of tens of years.
. The orbital decay figures shown in Figures I0.0-I and 10.0-2 are from a low-fidelity
simulation.A more sophisticatedecay model should be used to verifydecay time versus
altitude,year,and ballisticnumber.
6. Certain event probabilities could be improved with more research. These include:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
OMV launch and deployment (section 6.23) - a key event
Shuttle ascent (section 6.30) - also key
Go on batteries (section 6.3) - better numbers can be obtained
Mid Course (section 6.1) - the probability of hitting Earth after a miss on subsequent
orbits around the sun should be computed
EOI bums (6.27 and 6.28) - Motor reliability can be better determined
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If the biological material in the sample is assumed to carry its genetic information in long
chain molecules, it can be heat sterilized. A heat sterilization procedure needs to be
developed and agreed upon.
The weight penalties associated with the following proposals should be determined.
a) Sterilization system (phosphorus grenade?) inside the sample container to be fired in
the event of failures.
b) Protection material or containment package requh'ed in order to allow the SRC to hit
hard ground with no chute and not release the sample. Some very light mylar or
kevlar bag may be all that is needed.
c) Sample container that will heat the sample to the required sterilization conditions
before it breaks up.
The probability of a vehicle's on-time ascent to LEO to retrieve the SRC is a key number
unavailable at present to the authors. Simple ascent success probability is given in Table"
6.29-1. Successful ascent within a specified schedule also needs to be tabulated.
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